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490 
Comment 
WHEN THE CHILD’S BEST INTEREST CALLS FOR IT: 
POST-ADOPTION CONTACT BY COURT ORDER IN MARYLAND   
KRISTINA V. FOEHRKOLB∗
 
 
The child’s best interest is the governing standard in all child 
custody determinations, including visitation, divorce, termination of 
parental rights cases, and adoptions in Maryland.1  Psychological stu-
dies demonstrate that both continuity of psychological attachments 
and connection to the biological family are important to a child’s de-
velopment, identity formation, and overall psychological well-being.2  
Nevertheless, the current legal framework governing adoptions fol-
lowing termination of parental rights in Maryland does not allow 
courts to fashion relief that would truly be in the child’s best interest.3  
When a Maryland court terminates a parental relationship, it can or-
der post-termination visitation with the parent if it is in the child’s 
best interest.4  But such orders do not survive adoption.  If or when a 
child is adopted, courts are without power to extend the effect of a 
post-termination visitation order past adoption.5
 
Copyright © 2012 by Kristina V. Foehrkolb. 
  As a result, in cases 
where courts terminate parental rights in order to free the foster 
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  
This Comment is dedicated to the loving memory of the author’s grandmother, Valentina 
T. Kropacheva.  The author wishes to thank Professor Marc DeSimone for introducing her 
to this area of the law; Professor Jana Singer for her insightful comments on an earlier 
draft of this Comment; and the author’s family for their love and support, with very special 
thanks to the author’s children, Alex and Sasha, for their patience. 
 1. In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya C., 417 Md. 90, 112, 8 A.3d 745, 758 
(2010) [hereinafter Ta’Niya] (citations omitted). 
 2. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 3. See infra Part II.B.2.  This Comment will address only adoptions following termina-
tion of parental rights.  It will not discuss independent and private agency adoptions, in 
which biological parents relinquish their parental rights voluntarily and are able to nego-
tiate post-adoption contact with the prospective adoptive parents.  See MD. CODE ANN., 
FAM. LAW § 5-3A (West 2006) (private agency adoptions); id. § 5-3B (independent adop-
tions); id. § 5-308 (authorizing biological and adoptive parents to enter into post-adoption 
contact agreements). 
 4. FAM. LAW § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(5). 
 5. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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child for adoption, post-termination visitation orders are short-lived.  
In the absence of an agreement between the adoptive and biological 
parents, the subsequent adoption necessarily severs the child’s psy-
chological and biological ties to the biological parent.6
In re Adoption/Guardianship of Alonza D., Jr., and Shaydon D. (“Alon-
za”)
  
7 demonstrates the inadequacies of the current system.  Alonza 
and Shaydon were removed from their mother’s care and placed in 
foster care—as opposed to with their father—because the house 
where the father resided tested positive for the presence of lead.8  
The father had a “positive relationship” with his sons and visited them 
regularly.9  Nevertheless, because the prospective adoptive mother did 
not want the boys’ contact with their father to continue,10 when the 
father’s parental rights were terminated to free the boys for adop-
tion,11 the relationship between the boys and their father came to an 
end.12  (The author of this Comment participated in an appeal of this 
case.)13
This Comment will argue that continuation of foster children’s 
relationship with their biological parents following termination of pa-
rental rights and the subsequent adoption would be in the children’s 
best interest in cases like Alonza.
  
14  It will examine the statutory 
framework for adoption following termination of parental rights,15 
explore the importance of attachments and biological connection to 
the child’s psychological well-being,16 and address the legal presump-
tion that the parent always acts in the child’s best interest.17  The 
Comment will conclude first that courts should use their authority to 
order post-termination visitation,18
 
 6. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 and second that the legislature 
 7. 412 Md. 442, 987 A.2d 536 (2010) [hereinafter Alonza].     
 8. Id. at 444, 987 A.2d at 536, 537. 
 9. Id. at 445, 987 A.2d at 538. 
 10. Brief for Petitioner at 20 n.4, Alonza, 412 Md. 442, 987 A.2d 536 (2010) (No. 40), 
2009 WL 3197642, at *20 n.4.  
 11. Alonza, 412 Md. at 449–54, 987 A.2d at 540–43.  
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 211–216. 
 13. The author represented the children’s father in his latest appeal before the Mary-
land Court of Special Appeals, In re Adoption/Guardianship of Alonza D. and Shayon S., 
No. 2089 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 24, 2011), as a Maryland Rule 16 attorney through the 
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law Appellate Advocacy Clinic.  See 
infra note 215 for this case’s procedural history. 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See infra Part I.A. 
 16. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 17. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 18. See infra Part II.B.1. 
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should authorize courts to extend the effect of post-termination visita-
tion orders past adoption19 in cases where doing so would be in the 
child’s best interest.20
I.  BACKGROUND 
   
The child’s best interest governs all child custody determinations 
in Maryland, including third-party visitation, custody, termination of 
parental rights, and adoption proceedings.21  The exact contours of 
this standard, however, have proved difficult to define.22  That may be 
so because in any child custody dispute at least four interests are at 
stake: (1) the child’s interest in stable and nurturing relationships 
with significant adults,23 (2) the legal parent’s interest in making deci-
sions regarding the child’s upbringing,24 (3) the third party’s interest 
in visiting or having custody of the child,25 and (4) the State’s interest 
in protecting the child’s welfare in the State’s capacity of parens pa-
triae.26
In the context of adoption after termination of parental rights, 
these interests interact within the statutory framework for termination 
of parental rights and adoption proceedings.  The standard for both 
proceedings is the child’s best interest, which has both psychological 
and legal underpinnings.  Therefore, in the context of adoption after 
termination of parental rights, no discussion of the child’s best inter-
est is possible without examining first, the statutes governing termina-
tion of parental rights and adoptions,
   
27 second, the child’s best inter-
est from the psychological standpoint,28
 
 19. In this Comment “post-adoption contact” refers to contact between the biological 
parents whose rights have been terminated and their children who have been adopted.   
 and third, the United States 
Supreme Court’s and Maryland courts’ parental rights jurisprudence, 
 20. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 21. Ta’Niya, 417 Md. 90, 112, 8 A.3d 745, 758 (2010).   
 22. See id. at 94, 8 A.3d at 747 (stating that although the governing standard in termi-
nation of parental rights is the “‘best interests of the child,’ constitutional and common-
law rights of parents require consideration of countervailing factors that can make the 
‘best interest’ analysis somewhat circuitous”). 
 23. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 24. See infra Part I.B.2.a. 
 25. See, e.g., Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 664, 948 A.2d 73, 75 (2008) (ex-
amining a claim by a member of a same-sex relationship for custody or visitation of the 
child adopted by the other member of that relationship). 
 26. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 27. See infra Part I.A. 
 28. See infra Part I.B.1. 
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which presumes the parent always knows what is in his or her child’s 
best interest.29
A.  Adoption After Termination of Parental Rights in Maryland  
  
Adoption after termination of parental rights is a statutory me-
chanism that allows courts to terminate parental rights of one indi-
vidual and assign those rights to another individual.30  Although the 
State engages in both termination of parental rights (“TPR”) and 
adoption proceedings in its ancient parens patriae capacity of protect-
ing the welfare of the State’s citizens, neither mechanism existed at 
common law.31  Currently, TPR and adoption proceedings are codi-
fied in the Family Law Article, which outlines the powers and obliga-
tions of courts in deciding these matters.32
1. Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption Proceedings in 
Maryland from a Historical Perspective  
  
States have inherent authority to protect children’s welfare under 
the doctrine of parens patriae.  Under the doctrine, states have an in-
terest in protecting and promoting the welfare of their citizens, in-
cluding children.33  In Maryland, “[i]n this paternalistic role, the State 
imposes the obligation upon the parents to maintain, care for and 
protect their children.”34  “[W]henever necessary,” through its courts 
the State may regulate the parental relationship.35  In child custody 
matters, juvenile courts enjoy “the inherent power . . . of securing the 
welfare and promoting the best interest of the children.”36  Under the 
parens patriae power, courts are “in the unique position to marshal the 
applicable facts, assess the situation, and determine the correct means 
of fulfilling a child’s best interests.”37
 
 29. See infra Part I.B.2. 
  They also have broad powers “to 
afford whatever relief may be necessary to protect [the children’s] 
 30. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-323(b) (West 2006); id. § 5-352(a)(2).  Although 
termination of parental rights and adoption do not always go together, this Comment fo-
cuses on situations when they do.  
 31. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 32. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 33. In re Adoption/Guardianship of Victor A., 386 Md. 288, 300–01, 872 A.2d 662, 669 
(2005). 
 34. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 55 Md. App. 299, 309, 462 A.2d 1208, 1215 (1983).   
 35. Id. at 309–10, 462 A.2d at 1215. 
 36. Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 267, 145 A. 614, 615 (1929) (the reported title of 
this case in the Atlantic Reporter is Barnard v. Barnard).  
 37. In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 707, 782 A.2d 332, 343–44 (2001).  
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best interests.”38  Furthermore, courts maintain jurisdiction over the 
children’s welfare even following the initial custody, support, or visita-
tion determination.39  Their parens patriae role requires them “to mon-
itor the welfare of children in their jurisdiction and promote the 
children’s best interests.”40
However broad Maryland courts’ power to promote children’s 
best interests may have been at common law, it did not include the 
power to terminate parental rights and enter adoption decrees.
  
41  The 
law thus did not recognize as binding a parent’s attempt to relinquish 
parental rights and allowed parents “to retract and repudiate [any 
such promise] at any time.”42  At the same time, in the United States, 
it was rather common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for 
some parents to “apprentice” their children to live and work for other 
families.43  There were a few cases where “a court precluded a parent 
from regaining physical custody of a child who had been ‘appren-
ticed’ to another family and who was being well-treated.”44  But even 
though those cases effectively transferred at least some parental 
rights, there was no “legal authority under the common law in this 
State for a total relinquishment of parental rights and obligations or 
any inherent authority in any court to terminate them.”45
In fact, courts in the United States did not have “clear authoriza-
tion for the legal termination of the entire parental relationship” un-
til the passing of adoption statutes, which took place in Maryland only 
in the first half of the nineteenth century.
  
46  The first adoption sta-
tutes were in the form of private bills, and Maryland did not enact its 
first general adoption statute until 1892.47  At that time, the statute 
did not contain a “statement of purpose, and appears to have been 
primarily concerned with the effect of adoptions on inheritance and 
distribution of estates.”48
 
 38. Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 702, 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 
(1982).  
   
 39. Kennedy, 55 Md. App. at 310, 462 A.2d at 1215.  
 40. Id.  
 41. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2152A, 2153A, 2154A, 100 Md. App. 262, 279, 
641 A.2d 889, 897 (1994).  
 42. Carroll County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 172, 577 A.2d 14, 25 
(1990) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 43. Id. at 173, 577 A.2d at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 44. Id. at 173–74, 577 A.2d at 25.   
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 174, 577 A.2d at 25.   
 47. Id., 577 Md. at 25–26. 
 48. L.F.M. v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 67 Md. App. 379, 391, 507 A.2d 1151, 1157 (1986).  
Specifically, the 1892 adoption statute provided that:  
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In 1947, the General Assembly amended the 1892 adoption sta-
tute and added a statement of legislative policy, “acknowledg[ing] the 
need for protection of the familial integrity of the adopting parents as 
well as the protection of the natural parents and of the child.”49
the three-fold protection of (1) the adoptive child, from un-
necessary separation from his natural parents and from 
adoption by persons unfit to have such responsibility; (2) the 
natural parents, from hurried and abrupt decisions to give 
up the child; and (3) the adopting parents, by providing 
them information about the child and his background, and 
protecting them from subsequent disturbance of their rela-
tionships with the child by natural parents.
  Spe-
cifically, the statute identified its purpose as  
50
Other than minor changes in style, this statement of legislative 
intent remained the same until 2005, when it began to apply both to 
termination of parental rights proceedings and adoptions.
 
51
Therefore, as a parens patriae, the State of Maryland has historical-
ly enjoyed the right and had the responsibility to promote the child’s 
welfare by playing a role in all matters concerning children.  At com-
mon law, however, this parens patriae interest did not include the right 
to terminate parental rights of one parent and to assign them to 
another parent.  These powers are entirely statutorily-based. 
  
2. The Current Statutory Framework for Termination of Parental 
Rights and Adoption  
The General Assembly substantially restructured the TPR and 
adoption laws in 2005 by enacting the Permanency for Children and 
Families Act.52
 
[t]he effect of [a] decree of adoption shall be to entitle the child so adopted 
to . . . the same rights of protection, education and maintenance as if born to 
[the adopting parent] in lawful wedlock, and the natural parents of such child 
shall be freed from all legal obligations toward it . . . .   
  As a result, presently both the TPR and adoption sta-
tutes are codified under the Children subtitle of the Family Law Ar-
ticle.  The purpose of the laws governing TPR proceedings and adop-
tions is to:  
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting the 1892 Act).  This original adoption statute “re-
mained in effect without substantial change for more than fifty years.”  Id. 
 49. Id. at 392, 507 A.2d at 1157. 
 50. Id. (quoting the 1947 Act). 
 51. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-303 (West 2006) (providing an expanded pur-
pose beyond the scope of the 1947 purpose as seen in infra text accompanying note 53).   
 52. Alonza, 412 Md. 442, 455 n.8, 987 A.2d 536, 543 n.8 (2010).   
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(1) timely provide permanent and safe homes for children 
consistent with their best interests; 
(2) protect children from unnecessary separation from their 
parents; 
(3) ensure adoption only by individuals fit for the responsi-
bility; 
(4) protect parents from making hurried or ill-considered 
agreements to terminate parental rights; 
(5) protect prospective adoptive parents by giving them in-
formation about children and their backgrounds; and 
(6) protect adoptive parents from future disturbances of 
their relationships with children by former parents.53
To achieve these goals, the statutory framework allows for a 
number of ways to finalize children’s placements, including adoption 
without prior termination of parental rights and adoption after ter-
mination of parental rights.
 
54  As its name suggests, adoption after 
termination of parental rights is a two-step process.  First, in a sepa-
rate proceeding, the court terminates the biological parent’s parental 
rights and declares the State the child’s guardian.55  Second, the court 
allows the prospective adoptive family to adopt the child.56
a.  Termination of Parental Rights  
 
Termination of parental rights is a statutory mechanism that al-
lows the court to terminate an existing parental relationship and 
make the State the guardian of the child with the hope that the State 
will later re-transfer the parental rights to an adoptive family.57  Ter-
mination of parental rights “constitutes a total rescission of the legal 
relationship between parent and child, and that rescission is generally 
final.”58
(1) terminates a parent’s duties, obligations, and rights to-
ward the individual; (2) eliminates the need for a further 
consent by a parent to adoption of the individual; (3) grants 
a local department guardianship with the right to consent to 
  Specifically, in accordance with section 5-325, termination of 
parental rights  
 
 53. FAM. LAW § 5-303(b). 
 54. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-338 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010); FAM. LAW § 5-345 
(West 2006).   
 55. FAM. LAW § 5-323(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 56. FAM. LAW § 5-345 (West 2006); FAM. LAW § 5-350 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 57. In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H. and Terese H., 402 Md. 477, 494, 496, 
937 A.2d 177, 187–89 (2007) [hereinafter Rashawn]. 
 58. Id. at 496, 937 A.2d at 188. 
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the individual’s adoption or other planned permanent living 
arrangement; and (4) . . . terminates the individual’s CINA 
[(child in need of assistance)] case.59
The TPR process is rather straightforward.  In order to terminate 
parental rights, the Department of Social Services must file a Petition 
for Guardianship under section 5-313 of the Family Law Article.  In 
ruling on a guardianship petition, a juvenile court is required to “give 
primary consideration to the health and safety of the child.”
 
60  Impor-
tantly, the statute provides that before a juvenile court could grant the 
department guardianship of a child without a parent’s consent, the 
court must find “that a parent is unfit to remain in a parental rela-
tionship with the child or that exceptional circumstances exist that 
would make a continuation of the parental relationship detrimental 
to the best interests of the child such that terminating the rights of 
the parent is in the child’s best interest.”61  If the court makes those 
findings, it may grant the department’s guardianship petition, i.e. 
terminate the parent’s parental rights.62  Simultaneously, the court 
must also terminate the child’s CINA case and may order a number of 
directives in accordance with the child’s best interest, including “visi-
tation . . . with a specific individual,” placement, and provision of ser-
vices by the Department of Social Services.63
 
 59. FAM. LAW § 5-325(a) (West 2006).  A child in need of assistance (“CINA”) “means a 
child who requires court intervention because: (1) The child has been abused, has been 
neglected, has a developmental disability, or has a mental disorder; and (2) The child’s 
parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention 
to the child and the child’s needs.”  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-801(f) (West 
2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 
 60. FAM. LAW § 5-323(d) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 61. Id. § 5-323(b). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. § 5-324(b)(1).  The court must also set a date for a guardianship review hearing 
within 180 days of terminating parental rights.  Id. § 5-324(a)(3).  At the initial guardian-
ship review hearing, in accordance with the child’s best interest, the court determines the 
child’s permanency plan, which may be, in the order of priority,  
(i) adoption of the child;  
(ii) custody and guardianship of the child by an individual; or  
(iii) another planned permanent living arrangement that:  
1. addresses the individualized needs of the child, including the child’s educa-
tional plan, emotional stability, physical placement, and socialization needs; and  
2. includes goals that promote the continuity of relations with individuals who 
will fill a lasting and significant role in the child’s life. 
Id. § 5-326(a).  The department must make “[e]very reasonable effort . . . to implement a 
permanency plan within 1 year.”  Id. § 5-326(a)(1)(7). 
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b.  Adoption After Termination of Parental Rights 
Once the court terminates parental rights by assigning guardian-
ship of the child to the local Department of Social Services, the pros-
pective adoptive parents may petition for adoption.64  The adoption 
proceeding begins with the prospective adoptive parents filing a peti-
tion in accordance with section 5-345 of the Family Law Article.  The 
child’s biological parent’s consent for the child’s adoption is no long-
er necessary.65  Instead of the biological parent, the department, as 
the child’s guardian, and the child may consent to the adoption.66  
The adoption order makes the child’s adoptive parents the child’s 
parents “for all intent and purposes,” and relieves the biological par-
ent “of all parental duties and obligations to the adoptee.”67  The 
adoption order also terminates the department’s guardianship over 
the child.68
As part of the 2005 overhaul of the TPR laws, the Maryland legis-
lature has begun to expressly authorize prospective adoptive parents 
and biological parents, as well as adoptive parents and former par-
ents, to enter into post-adoption contact agreements to allow adopted 
children to have contact with the biological parents following adop-
tion.
 
69  Any such agreement must be attached to the adoption peti-
tion,70 is enforceable in court, and may be modified upon a showing 
of an exceptional circumstance making modification in the child’s 
best interest.71
As this brief overview of Maryland’s TPR and adoption after TPR 
statutes demonstrates, the General Assembly has spelled out a 
straightforward process for termination of parental rights and adop-
tions after termination of parental rights.  First, the court terminates 
the biological parents’ parental rights upon a showing of parental un-
 
 
 64. Id. § 5-345(a). 
 65. Id. § 5-325(a)(2).  In fact, the court is not even required to inform the biological 
parent of the filing of the petition for adoption.  Id. § 5-315. 
 66. Id. § 5-351.  The child’s consent to adoption is necessary for a child over the age of 
ten.  Id. § 5-350. 
 67. Id. § 5-352(a)(2). 
 68. Id. § 5-328(c). 
 69. Id. § 5-308(a).  The legislature did not, however, give courts specific authority to 
order post-adoption contact in the absence of such an agreement between the parties.  1 
MD. LAW ENCYC. § 51 (West 2009); see infra Part II.B.2. 
 70. FAM. LAW § 5-345(c)(1)(ii) & (c)(2). 
 71. Id. § 5-308(f)(1).  The party seeking modification of a post-adoption visitation 
agreement must demonstrate “that modification is justified because an exceptional cir-
cumstance has arisen and the court finds modification to be in an adoptee’s best inter-
ests.”  Id. § 5-308(f)(2).  The statute also provides that the court may refer any disputes re-
garding the agreement to mediation.  Id. § 5-308(e). 
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fitness or exceptional circumstances making continuation of the pa-
rental relationship detrimental to the child’s best interest.  Second, 
the court may allow another family to adopt the child, giving the 
adoptive families all rights and responsibilities regarding custody and 
care for the child.  Through this process, in the name of the child’s 
best interest, the child loses one set of parents and gains another. 
B.  The Child’s Best Interest 
All child custody matters in Maryland, including termination of 
parental rights, adoptions, custody, and visitation are governed by the 
child’s best interest.  Although easy to state, in practice this standard 
has not been easy to define72 or apply73 because it combines a number 
of considerations and may encompass other interests in addition to 
the child’s best interest.  From the point of view of the child’s psycho-
logical well-being, continuity of relationships—psychological and bio-
logical—should receive the utmost consideration in child custody de-
terminations.74  From a constitutional law point of view, more weight 
may be assigned to the child’s relationship with a legal parent to the 
exclusion of all other relationships.75  Finding a proper balance be-
tween these countervailing interests may be difficult but necessary in 
order to come as close as possible to meeting the child’s “best” inter-
est.76
1.  The Child’s Best Interest from the Standpoint of Psychology 
   
From the psychological point of view, preserving continuity of a 
child’s attachments and maintaining the child’s ties to the biological 
family are in the child’s best interest.  Attachments are important be-
cause they have a profound influence on the “child’s psycho-social 
 
 72. As the court observed in Montgomery County Department of Social Services v. Sanders,  
The United Nations Declaration states “[m]ankind owes to a child the best it has 
to give.”  Very few persons will quarrel with the tenor of that assertion.  What 
gives rise to controversy is not the general proposition of mankind’s obligation 
to provide what is best for the child, but rather, what is best.  
38 Md. App. 406, 407, 381 A.2d 1154, 1156 (1978).  
 73. In Ta’Niya, the court admitted its third-party custody and TPR jurisprudence shows 
the court “ha[s] struggled in defining how parental unfitness, exceptional circumstances 
and the child’s best interest analyses relate to one another.”  417 Md. 90, 94, 8 A.3d 745, 
747 (2010).   
 74. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 75. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 76. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
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functioning.”77  Disruption of attachments in childhood impairs a 
child’s ability to form meaningful relationships in adulthood, use the 
individual’s full potential for acquiring new knowledge and skills,78 
and often accompanies psychiatric disturbances.79  Furthermore, 
maintaining the biological connection is vital for the formation of an 
individual’s identity and overall psychological well-being.80  Because 
“no one developmental theory can provide a complete understanding 
of child psycho-social development,”81
a.    Attachment Theory: A Link Between Separation from Primary 
Caretaker in Childhood and Psychological Problems and 
Psychiatric Disorders in Adulthood 
 this Comment examines some 
of the more prominent and innovative theories applicable in the 
adoption context, including (1) the attachment theory, (2) the psy-
chological parent theory, and (3) the importance of the biological 
connection in the child’s psycho-social development. 
The attachment theory is one of the most successful and endur-
ing developmental theories of the past century.  Under the theory, 
the attachment behavior is thought to be “organized by means of a 
control system within the central nervous system, analogous to the 
physiological control systems that maintain physiological measures 
such as blood pressure and body temperature within set limits.”82  The 
attachment theory undertakes to “explain[] the many forms of emo-
tional distress and personality disturbance, including anxiety, anger, 
depression, and emotional detachment, to which unwilling separation 
and loss give rise.”83
 
 77. KWAME OWUSU-BEMPAH, CHILDREN AND SEPARATION: SOCIO-GENEALOGICAL 
CONNECTEDNESS PERSPECTIVE 10 (2007). 
 
 78. Phillip R. Shaver & Maria Mikulincer, An Overview of Adult Attachment Theory, in 
ATTACHMENT THEORY AND RESEARCH IN CLINICAL WORK WITH ADULTS 17, 21 (Joseph H. 
Obegi & Ety Berant eds., 2009). 
 79. JOHN BOWLBY, THE MAKING & BREAKING OF AFFECTIONAL BONDS 71 (1979).  Clini-
cal research shows “[t]hose who suffer from psychiatric disturbances, whether psycho-
neurotic, sociopathic, or psychotic, always show impairment of the capacity for affectional 
bonding, an impairment that is often both severe and long lasting.”  Id.  
 80. See infra Part I.B.1.c. 
 81. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 20.  
 82. JOHN BOWLBY, A SECURE BASE: PARENT-CHILD ATTACHMENT AND HEALTHY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 123 (1988). 
 83. BOWLBY, supra note 79, at 127. 
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i.  Attachment Formation Is a “Basic Component of Human 
Nature” 
Under the attachment theory “the propensity to make intimate 
emotional bonds [is] a basic component of human nature.”84  Accord-
ing to the theory’s founder, John Bowlby, infants are programmed by 
evolution to engage in behaviors that ensure proximity with adults, 
“who are likely to provide protection from physical and psychological 
threats, promote safe and healthy exploration of the environment, 
and help the infant learn to regulate emotions effectively.”85  It is at 
this early stage of infancy that an individual’s attachment style begins 
to form and stays with him or her “from the cradle to the grave,” acti-
vating whenever the individual “is distressed, ill, or afraid.”86
These early experiences form mental representations of attach-
ments, or “internal working models” of relationships.
   
87  Although re-
lationships with different people imprint a number of internal work-
ing models in an individual’s memory, because the child’s 
relationship with the attachment figure predominates over other rela-
tionships and surfaces more often, the internal working model of that 
relationship is going to have more influence over the individual in the 
long run.88
 
 84. BOWLBY, supra note 
  Accordingly, the kind of relationship the child had with 
82, at 120–21. 
 85. Shaver & Mikulincer, supra note 78, at 18 (emphasis omitted).  John Bowlby is con-
sidered the father of modern attachment theory.  JERROLD R. BRANDELL & SHOSHANA 
RINGEL, ATTACHMENT AND DYNAMIC PRACTICE: AN INTEGRATIVE GUIDE FOR SOCIAL 
WORKERS AND OTHER CLINICIANS 29 (2007).  Mary Ainsworth expanded and deepened the 
theory by new methodology and additional concepts.  Inge Bretherton, The Origins of At-
tachment Theory: John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth, in ATTACHMENT THEORY: SOCIAL, 
DEVELOPMENTAL, AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 45 (Susan Goldberg et al. eds., 1995) 
[hereinafter ATTACHMENT THEORY].  Generally, the theory combines “concepts from 
ethology, cybernetics, information processing, developmental psychology, and psychoana-
lysis.”  Id.  
 86. Giovanni Liotti, Disorganized/Disoriented Attachment in the Psychotherapy of the Dissocia-
tive Disorders, in ATTACHMENT THEORY, supra note 85, at 343, 343.  Indeed, John Bowlby’s 
early work, which would later develop into the attachment theory, began as an examina-
tion of the mother-infant relationship.  BOWLBY, supra note 82, at 21–22. 
 87. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 12.  The internal working models identify the 
attachment figure for the child and indicate how available and reliable he or she is.  Id.  
These inner working models are not just characteristic of children’s perceptions of their 
attachment figures; on the contrary, “[o]nce the inner working models become estab-
lished, they are increasingly likely to define social experience rather than be defined by 
social experience.”  Id.  (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88. Shaver & Mikulincer, supra note 78, at 24–25.  Because an infant’s and 
a child’s interactions with the primary caregiver are “fairly consistent,” their pat-
tern is likely to become part of a person’s implicit procedural knowledge about 
close relationships, social interactions, and distress regulation.  They tend to op-
erate automatically and unconsciously and are resistant to change.  Thus what 
FoehrkolbFinalBookProof 3/14/2012  12:46 PM 
502 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:490 
his or her primary caretaker is going to determine what kind of an at-
tachment style the child will develop and maintain through life.89
ii. The Role of Attachments and Their Continuity in the 
Individual’s Mental and Overall Well-Being 
   
The persistency of internal working models and their role in the 
formation of a person’s attachment style “suggest that, beginning in 
infancy and throughout the life cycle, an individual’s mental health is 
intractably linked to their attachment relationships.”90  Indeed, there 
is a consensus in the field of psychiatry and psychotherapy “that 
childhood separation or maladaptive attachment or maladaptive 
working models are implicated in almost every mental disorder.”91  
According to Bowlby, “[t]hose who suffer from psychiatric distur-
bances, whether psycho-neurotic, sociopathic, or psychotic, always 
show impairment of the capacity for affectional bonding, an impair-
ment that is often both severe and long lasting.”92  Hence, not surpri-
singly, “[b]oth the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disord-
ers . . . and the International Classification of Disease . . . include 
attachment disorders of childhood in their classification systems.”93
As one researcher explains, Bowlby attributed this correlation be-
tween mental disorders and incapacity to form affectional bonds to “a 
disturbance of bonding[] in childhood which he regarded as the 
cause of psychiatric disorders.”
 
94
 
began as representations of specific interactions with particular primary caregiv-
ers during childhood tend to be applied in new situations and relationships, and 
eventually they have an effect on attachment-related experiences, decisions, and 
actions in adulthood. 
  Bowlby believed “that both parental 
loss and prolonged separations from parents in childhood were po-
tentially traumatic experiences,” and “that the stable presence of pri-
mary caretakers was essential to healthy personality development, 
while discontinuities in this care could have profound deleterious ef-
Id. at 25. 
 89. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 13.  (“The type and quality of the working mod-
els which children develop of their attachment figures are believed to exercise a profound 
and lasting influence on their relationships throughout the rest of their lives.”).  There are 
three principal attachment styles: secure, anxious-ambivalent, and anxious-avoidant.  For a 
discussion of the characteristics of these attachment styles and their manifestation in 
childhood and adulthood, see BOWLBY, supra note 82, at 124. 
 90. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 11. 
 91. Id. at 14. 
 92. BOWLBY, supra note 79, at 71. 
 93. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 14 (citations omitted).  
 94. Id. at 11.  
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fects.”95  In childhood, the negative effect of separation manifests it-
self through “symptoms rang[ing] from emotional problems such as 
enuresis to physical growth problems such as dwarfism.”96  Later in 
life, adults who had been separated as children may have psychiatric 
problems such as “[c]hronic anxiety, intermittent depression, at-
tempted or successful suicide [and development of] psychopathic or 
sociopathic personalities.”97
On a seemingly less drastic level, other theorists and researchers 
have argued that the type of an individual’s attachment style has an 
impact on at least three major aspects of that individual’s life.  First, 
healthy attachment behavior is crucial in forming and maintaining re-
lationships because every positive “attachment-related interaction” 
reinforces an individual’s sense of security.
   
98  Second, a healthy at-
tachment style “help[s] a person maintain emotional balance and re-
silience in the face of stress” because it equips a secure individual with 
tools to deal with negative emotions.99  Third, “attachment security 
[i]s an important foundation for developing skills and competence of 
all kinds” because the individual does not feel intimidated by new 
challenges and endeavors.100
b. The Psychological Parent Doctrine: When the Primary Caretaker 
Is Not the Child’s Legal Parent 
 
While the attachment theory underscores the importance of an 
uninterrupted attachment to the caregiver, the “psychological parent” 
doctrine hypothesizes that what matters for a child’s psychological 
well-being is the psychological connection between the child and the 
 
 95. Kenneth S. Adam et al., Attachment Organization and Vulnerability to Loss, Separation, 
and Abuse in Disturbed Adolescents, in ATTACHMENT THEORY, supra note 85, at 309, 313.  
 96. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 6. 
 97. BOWLBY, supra note 79, at 81. 
 98. Shaver & Mikulincer, supra note 78, at 21.  (“Every attachment-related interaction 
that restores a person’s sense of security reaffirms the value of closeness and strengthens 
affectional bonds with the relationship partner responsible for augmenting the sense of 
security.”). 
 99. Id.  A healthy attachment style plays “an important part in teaching a person how to 
regulate and deescalate negative emotions, such as anger, anxiety, and sadness.”  Id. 
 100. Id. (“A child or adult who feels threatened and inadequately protected or sup-
ported has a difficult time directing attention to free play, curious investigation of objects 
and environments, and affiliative relationships with peers.  Extended over long periods of 
time, this kind of interference disrupts the development of self-efficacy, self-esteem, and 
positive, trusting social attitudes.”).   Id. 
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parent.101  According to the doctrine’s founders, Goldstein, Freud, 
and Solnit,102
Unlike adults, children have no psychological conception of 
relationship by blood-tie until quite late in their develop-
ment.  For the biological parents, the facts of having engen-
dered [] or given birth to a child produce an understanda-
ble sense of preparedness for proprietorship and 
possessiveness.  These considerations carry no weight with 
children who are emotionally unaware of the events leading 
to their births.  What registers in their minds are the day-to-
day interchanges with the adults who take care of them and 
who, on the strength of these, become the parent figures to 
whom they are attached.
 
103
Thus, under the psychological parent theory, a child’s relation-
ship with the biological parent is only meaningful to the child if the 
biological parent is also the psychological parent.
 
104
Regardless of the existence of the blood relationship between the 
child and his or her primary caretaker, if there is a “forcible interrup-
tion” of a child’s relationship with the person who provides for the 
child’s daily needs, the child reacts “with emotional distress and a set-
back of ongoing development.”
  
105  The extent of the setback depends 
on the child’s age at the time of the separation.106
 
 101. According to Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, the “psychological parent” is one who 
continuously and consistently provides for a child’s physical and emotional needs.  JOSEPH 
GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
17 (1973).   
  For instance, from 
birth to approximately eighteen months, children may react to sepa-
ration by refusing food, and experiencing “digestive upsets, sleeping 
 102. The doctrine was first introduced in the 1970s in the book Beyond the Best Interests of 
the Child,  in which the authors—Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit—criticized courts for disre-
garding the child’s need for continuity of relationships and advocated a child-centered 
approach in child placement decisions, including but not limited to foster care, custody, 
and adoption.  Id. at 5.  The ideas expressed in the book lack support of clinical research 
but according to the preface, the authors appeared to have relied on clinical experience 
about the relationships “between children and their adult environment” gained in the 
Hampstead Child-Therapy Clinic and “actual cases of broken families [and] displaced 
children” of the Child Study Center at Yale University.  Id. at ix–x.  See also Marsha Garri-
son, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 457 & n.155 (1983) (noting that 
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit did not provide readers with studies or theoretical work sup-
porting their findings).     
 103. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 101, at 12–13. 
 104. Conversely, the child may be attached to any caring adult, such as a foster, adop-
tive, or “common-law adoptive” parent.  Id. at 27, 19. 
 105. Id. at 27. 
 106. Id. at 32.   
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difficulties, and crying.”107  Infants who have experienced early sepa-
rations “not only suffer separation distress and anxiety but also set-
backs in the quality of their next attachments, which will be less trust-
ful.”108
Similarly, young children under the age of five manifest distress 
caused by separation by regressing in newly acquired skills, such as us-
ing the bathroom or speaking.
   
109  Likewise, when school-aged child-
ren are separated from their psychological parents, they tend to expe-
rience a more profound relapse in “those achievements which are 
based on identification with the parents’ demands, prohibitions, and 
social ideals.”110  If children are made to go from one foster family to 
another during this stage of development, “they may cease to identify 
with any set of substitute parents.”111
To avoid such deleterious effects on the child’s psychological 
well-being, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit advocate child placement 
guidelines that provide “the least detrimental available alternative for 
safeguarding the child’s growth and development.”
   
112  In their opi-
nion, such placement decisions must provide children with a timely 
“opportunity to be placed with adults who are or are likely to become 
their psychological parents,”113 even if that comes at the expense of 
losing the children’s relationship with their biological parents.  Al-
though the doctrine was considered controversial at first, with time it 
has received “widespread acceptance” and influenced foster care leg-
islation in many states.114
 
 107. Id.  When an infant is moved from one home to another, there are “changes in the 
ways the infant is handled, fed, put to bed, and comforted.  Such moves from the familiar 
to the unfamiliar cause discomfort, distress and delays in the infant’s orientation and 
adaptation within his surroundings.”  Id.   
   
 108. Id. at 33. 
 109. Id. (emphasis omitted).  Young children tend to regress in “those achievements 
which are rooted and develop in the intimate interchange with a stable parent figure, who 
is in the process of becoming the psychological parent.”  Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 33–34.  Accordingly, multiple placements during the school age “puts many 
children beyond the reach of educational influence, and becomes the direct cause of be-
havior which the schools experience as disrupting and the courts label as dissocial, delin-
quent, or even criminal.”  Id. at 34.   
 112. Id. at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The authors prefer to use the term 
“the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child’s growth and devel-
opment” over “the child’s best interest standard” in part in recognition of the fact that a 
child subject to child placement decisions “is already a victim of his environmental cir-
cumstances, that he is greatly at risk, and that speedy action is necessary to avoid further 
harm being done to his chances of healthy psychological development.”  Id. at 54.  
 113. Id. at 31.   
 114. Garrison, supra note 102, at 449. 
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c.  The Biological Connection  
Neither Bowlby’s attachment theory, with the roots in the moth-
er-infant relationship, nor Goldstein’s psychological theory, with its 
exclusive focus on the child’s current psychological parent, account 
for the longing that children have for finding the biological parents 
from whom they have been separated.  This is the result mainly be-
cause Bowlby’s theory was first formulated in the late 1940s/early 
1950s115 and Goldstein’s psychological parent theory was first intro-
duced in the 1970s,116 when the environment in which many children 
grew up was significantly different from the present.  Today, “a much 
higher proportion of children” experience “separation and loss of 
one or both birth parents not only through divorce or death, but also 
through fostering and adoption.”117  These new circumstances of 
child upbringing sparked a number of studies, seeking to understand 
the impact of the child’s separation from the child’s biological par-
ents and placement with an adoptive family on the child’s psychologi-
cal development.118
i.  Socio-Genealogical Connectedness  
  Specifically, these new studies examined (1) the 
socio-genealogical connectedness theory, (2) the effects of closed and 
open adoptions, and (3) the importance of preserving contact with 
biological parents for foster children. 
The socio-genealogical connectedness119 theory is a relatively new 
developmental theory that attempts to explain the psycho-
developmental difficulties of children separated from their biological 
parents.120
 
 115. BOWLBY, supra note 
  As opposed to actual interactions and the resulting at-
tachment between children and their caretakers, on which both 
Bowlby’s attachment theory and Goldstein’s psychological parent-
hood theory are based, the socio-genealogical connectedness theory 
examines the “sense of human connectedness, social and genealogical 
linkage” that exists between biological relatives even in the absence of 
82, at 21. 
 116. See supra note 102. 
 117. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 21. 
 118. See Karen March & Charlene Miall, Adoption as a Family Form, 49 FAM. REL. 359, 
360–61 (2000) (introducing a number of studies on open adoptions and foster adoptions).  
 119. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at ix (“The term socio-genealogical connectedness 
refers to the degree of our knowledge about our hereditary origins and the extent to 
which one assimilates that knowledge into one’s inner world.”). 
 120. Id. at 22–23.  But see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 101, at 12 (arguing that “children have 
no psychological conception of relationship by blood-tie until quite late in their develop-
ment”).   
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face-to-face contact.121  Thus, the theory attempts to explain why a 
child may be bonded not only to a nurturing adult present in his or 
her life, but also to an abusive parent, a parent from whom the child 
is separated, and even to a biological family member the child has 
“never actually met, such as a father or grandparent who died before 
the child was born.”122
The socio-genealogical connectedness theory is based on three 
main principles.  First, under the theory, the amount or quality of in-
formation a child has about his or her biological parents determines 
the extent to which the child will integrate the parents’ biological, 
cultural, and social backgrounds into the child’s inner world.
 
123  
Second, the more adequate the information a child has about his or 
her biological roots, the deeper the child’s sense of connectedness 
and belonging.124  Third, children with a deeper sense of connected-
ness are better equipped to deal with separation than children who 
lack the sense of connectedness or whose sense of connectedness is 
weak.125
According to the theory’s founder, Kwame Owusu-Bempah, “de-
liberate denial or negative distortion of parental information to a 
child may be equated with deliberate infliction of emotional abuse on 
that child, which is as psychologically damaging as sexual abuse and 
may be as physically detrimental as starvation.”
   
126
 
 121. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 
  The biological par-
ent and information about him or her is so important to a child that 
77, at 21–22, 34–35.  In distinguishing between at-
tachment built on interaction and a sense of connectedness that exists in the absence of 
an interactive relationship, Owusu-Bempah builds on Mary Ainsworth’s distinction be-
tween attachment behavior and attachment bond.  Id. at 34–35.  Ainsworth used the term 
“attachment behavior” to describe proximity-seeking behavior of an infant toward his or 
her attachment figure and a subsequent integration of those behaviors in an adult.  Id. at 
34.  In contrast, the term “attachment bond” referred to an affectional tie, which may exist 
regardless of whether attachment behavior is also present.  Id. 
 122. Id. at 35; see also Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents: 
Their Effect on Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 FAM. L.Q. 233 (1986) (ar-
guing the social services system must begin to recognize the importance of the biological 
family and provide reunification services that actually give biological parents a chance for 
reunification).   
 123. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 23. 
 124. Id.   
 125. Id.  Conversely, the less adequate or less favorable the information the child has 
about the biological family, the less likely the child is to integrate that information, and, as 
a result, the weaker the child’s sense of his or her connectedness will be.  Id. 
 126. Id. at 73 (citations omitted).  Owusu-Bempah studied the relationship between the 
amount and quality of information children in single-parent families have about the bio-
logical parent who is not present in their lives, and reviewed studies performed by other 
researchers and practitioners on the issue of childhood separation.  Id. at 47, 52–53, 71. 
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devaluation or negation of even an abusive or neglectful parent is de-
trimental to the child’s well-being.127
Indeed, this intricate connection between children and their 
parents may make children who lack information about their biologi-
cal parents or possess inadequate information “genealogically bewil-
dered.”
   
128  Even though children may not manifest “overt concern 
about their lack of [knowledge] at every stage of their development, 
at some time, usually in early adolescence, they will begin searching 
for clues.”129  This search for clues about one’s hereditary roots be-
comes especially prevalent during adolescence because adolescence is 
a critical age for identity formation.130  Some adolescents who are de-
prived of socio-genealogical information become so obsessive in their 
search that it turns into a preoccupation of “disturbing proportions,” 
as they “seem to believe that solving this problem will lead to solutions 
to all their troubles.”131  This often happens in the adopted communi-
ty, where the break in “the socio-genealogical linkage is obvious.”132
To avoid the adverse effects of the severance of the socio-
genealogical connection, Owusu-Bempah advocates for continued 
contact between the child and the non-resident biological parent af-
ter separation to allow the child to gain socio-genealogical informa-
tion from such contact.
   
133
 
 127. Id. at 54, 73.  To illustrate the importance of the parental image to the child, Owu-
su-Bempah uses the extreme example of a child clinging to an abusive parent while being 
removed from the abusive parent’s custody by child protection services or running away 
from an adequate foster home to an abusive or neglectful parent.  Id. at 54.  Owusu-
Bempah explains this paradox by the child’s tendency to associate himself or herself with 
the parent to the point that “the denial or denigration of [any] parent[, even an abusive or 
neglectful one,] results in the negation of the child’s self and subsequent splitting off of 
that self part.”  Id. at 73. 
  In instances “[w]here such contact is al-
ready severed or restricted, it will be in the child’s interest for social 
workers or therapists to inform the custodial parent of the benefits of 
 128. Id. at 95.  “A genealogically bewildered child is one who has either no knowledge 
of his natural parents or only uncertain knowledge about them.  The resulting state of 
confusion and uncertainty fundamentally undermines his security and thus affects his 
mental health.”  Id. (citations omitted).  This equally applies to adopted children, step-
children, foster children, and children in single-parent and divorced families.  Id. 
 129. Id. at 95–96. 
 130. Owusu-Bempah describes one’s identity as “the awareness, understanding and ac-
ceptance of both the self and one’s biological, cultural and social roots.”  Id. at 99.   
 131. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 95–96.  
 132. Id. at 44; see also Beyer & Mlyniec, supra note 122, at 238 (“An adolescent’s normal 
search for an independent identity can result in a reassertion of the original connection, 
irrespective of the biological parent’s inadequacy and the foster or adoptive parent’s 
love.”). 
 133. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 53, 73–74.  
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contact, and to encourage the parties concerned to facilitate con-
tact.”134
ii.  Closed and Open Adoption Studies 
 
The studies of the effects of parental separation on adopted 
children also suggest that the biological connection cannot be disre-
garded.  For the most part of the twentieth century, psychologists be-
lieved that closed adoptions with a total severance of biological ties of 
adopted children promoted attachment between those children and 
their adoptive parents.135  As a result, confidential adoptions, where 
the adoption records were kept secret, were the norm.136  To further 
promote this policy of confidentiality, adoption agencies sought to 
“match” the prospective adoptive parents with their prospective 
adopted children “in terms of appearance, interests, intelligence, per-
sonality, or other traits.”137  If the “match” was a “good” one, the 
adopted child may have looked as if he was the adoptive parents’ bio-
logical child, thereby making it easier for the adoptive parent not to 
reveal to the child the fact of adoption and more possible that the 
child would not question his or her heritage.138  The law reflected 
these beliefs, “contemplat[ing] a clean break from the past, extin-
guishing all biological family connections . . . and even changing the 
child’s birth certificate to reflect the adoptive parents as the child’s 
birth parents.”139
Beginning with the 1960s, however, researchers began to ques-
tion the view that the secrecy surrounding adoptions promoted the 
adopted child’s adjustment in the adoptive family.
 
140
 
 134. Id. at 74. 
  Instead, it be-
 135. Jeanne Etter, Levels of Cooperation and Satisfaction in 56 Open Adoptions, 72 CHILD 
WELFARE 257, 258–59 (1993); see also Harold D. Grotevant et al., Adoptive Identity: How Con-
texts Within and Beyond the Family Shape Developmental Pathways, 49 FAM. REL. 379, 379 (2000) 
(discussing how social changes have prompted a change in the adoption practices).   
 136. Another reason adoptions used to be confidential was the desire to protect child-
ren from the prevailing societal attitudes regarding “illegitimacy” or “bad blood,” “asso-
ciated with being born out of wedlock, being infertile, or having a child outside of mar-
riage.”  Grotevant, supra note 135, at 379 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 137. Id. at 379–80. 
 138. See id. at 380 (stating that “[t]he underlying goal of matching was for the child to 
be able to ‘pass’ as a biologically-related member of the adoptive family”).  
 139. Annette Ruth Appell, Reflections on the Movement Toward a More Child-Centered Adop-
tion, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). 
 140. See Grotevant, supra note 135, at 380 (citing H. David Kirk’s work from 1965, 1981, 
and 1995).  But see Michael P. Sobol et al., Paths to the Facilitation of Open Adoption, 49 FAM. 
REL. 419, 419 (2000) (observing that proponents of “maintaining confidentiality argue 
that open adoption interferes with proper grieving for the birth mother, has negative ef-
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came known that with acknowledgment of the child’s adopted status 
adoption outcomes were better because the acknowledgment of the 
adopted status “necessitates recognizing the importance of the biolog-
ical relatives in the child’s life.”141  With time, the psychologists un-
derstood that to ensure healthy development, more than mere ac-
knowledgement of the child’s adoptive status was necessary because 
many adoptees wanted “to know their genealogical history, increase 
their sense of identity and to establish a relationship with birth par-
ents.”142  Thus, over the last four decades the concept of openness in 
adoptions143 has expanded and now encompasses a range of options, 
from prospective adoptive parents meeting the biological parents 
without exchanging identifying information, to the occasional ex-
change of letters and phone calls or frequent face-to-face contact after 
adoption.144  Slowly but steadily, the law has been catching up with 
these developments, and many states have enacted statutes allowing 
post-adoption contact between adopted children and their biological 
parents.145
Although studies on post-adoption contact show that at the be-
ginning of the adoptive journey many adoptive parents tend to be he-
sitant about post-adoption contact, research suggests once they have 
experienced openness in adoption, they begin to see it in a positive 
light.
  Maryland, however, is not one of them.  
146
 
fects on the child’s development, leads to adoptive parent insecurity and uncertainty, and 
is more likely to result in identity confusion for the adoptee”).  
  This may seem counterintuitive, but in “open adoptions, 
 141. Etter, supra note 135, at 259; see also Grotevant, supra note 135, at 380 (noting a 
change in the adoptive policies following a realization of “the importance of acknowledg-
ing the unique circumstances of adoptive families”); Sobol, supra note 140, at 419 (noting 
that for Kirk, the pioneer researcher who was the first to introduce the concept of open-
ness in adoptions, “openness pertained only to communicative relationships within the 
nuclear adoptive family and not to individuals outside of this family group”). 
 142. Michael P. Sobol & Jeanette Cardiff, A Sociopsychological Investigation of Adult Adop-
tees’ Search for Birth Parents, 32 FAM. REL. 477, 477 (1983).  
 143. “Open adoption” may be defined as an adoption with “an ongoing channel be-
tween biological and adoptive parents, with communication going both ways.”  Etter, supra 
note 135, at 260. 
 144. Sobol, supra note 140, at 419.  For a discussion of the variety of open adoption op-
tions currently in existence and their possible effects on the parties involved, see Leigh 
Gaddie, Open Adoption, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 499 (2009).   
 145. See Appell, supra note 139, at 3 n.6 (observing that since 1990, the number of cases 
and statutes allowing post-adoption contact agreements has grown significantly).  Appell 
points out that there are two types of post-adoption contact statutes: (1) those permitting 
courts to enforce post-adoption contact agreements between biological and adoptive par-
ents, and (2) those permitting courts to order post-adoption contact in the absence of an 
agreement between parties.  Id. at 5.  
 146. See Sobol, supra note 140, at 419 (pointing out that although potential adoptive 
parents often fear openness will result in the birth mother’s attempt to regain custody, af-
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adoptive parents feel a greater sense of entitlement to parent and less 
fear of losing the child to [the] birth family.”147  Also, researchers 
have found no “deleterious effect” of openness on younger children, 
and although research of the effect of openness on adolescents re-
mains to be seen, the reunion outcomes of adult adoptees likewise 
suggest that “accessibility to birth parents should aid in resolving 
many of the identity challenges late adolescent adoptees may encoun-
ter.”148
iii.  Foster-Care Adoptions 
 
The discovery that confidential adoptions do not promote the in-
terests of either party in the adoption triad coincided with the social 
changes of the 1960s and 1970s, which reduced the number of un-
wanted pregnancies and normalized single parenting, thereby reduc-
ing the number of healthy infants available for adoption and making 
“matching” more challenging.149  At the same time, a greater number 
of children in foster care became available for adoption.150  These 
children were different from the “healthy infants” who used to com-
prise “the largest pool” of prospective adopted children in that many 
foster children were older and had lived with their biological parents 
for some time prior to being separated from them.151
Studies on continued contact between foster children and their 
biological parents demonstrate that contact “generally promotes the 
child’s sense of well-being and emotional security.”
  
152  The benefits of 
maintaining the biological connection were evident not only among 
children who were separated from their biological parents at an older 
age153
 
ter experiencing openness they become less fearful and even “have a greater sense of 
permanence about the adoption”). 
 but “even [among] children who were separated from their 
parents at a very early age and whose subsequent contacts with their 
 147. Id. at 423. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Grotevant, supra note 135, at 380. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  Other research showed that the older the child is at the time of adoption, and 
the more the adopted child knows about his or her biological parents, the more likely he 
or she is to search for them.  Sobol & Cardiff, supra note 142, at 479–80, 482.   
 152. Garrison, supra note 102, at 461.  Garrison notes, however, “that most studies have 
not measured the child’s well-being in any consistent manner, and one study measured it 
only by impressionable evidence.”  Id. at 461 n.169.  
 153. See Beyer & Mlyniec, supra note 122, at 238 (“The continuing relationship between 
a seven- or eight-year-old child and a biological parent with whom he has lived cannot be 
denied.  That connection exists forever.  Neither adoption nor limited visitation with the 
biological parent during foster care can cut the lifeline.”).   
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parents are sporadic.”154  For instance, one study “found that frequent 
parental visitation correlated strongly with higher ratings on a variety 
of scales designed to measure the child’s intellectual and emotional 
development.”155
Although adoptions of children from foster care have become 
more common,
  
156 there has been little research on how openness and 
contact with the biological parents plays out in those circumstances.157  
One longitudinal study focused solely on the openness and contact in 
adoptions of foster care children that followed a large number of fam-
ilies over a period of several years.158  It revealed that contact with the 
biological parents of the adopted children has evolved over the 
years.159  Although the amount of contact declined within the two 
years immediately following adoption, it stabilized during the later 
years.160  The researchers expected the contact with the biological 
parents to increase, however, as the children reached adolescence.161
As psychology shows us, attachments, especially the attachment 
to the primary caregiver, are very important to the child’s develop-
ment and psychological well-being.  Likewise, the child’s contact with 
the biological family may be equally important to the child’s identity 
formation and may affect the child for the rest of his or her life.  
 
 
 154. Garrison, supra note 102, at 461.  Garrison pointed out that these studies did not 
exclude children who had neglectful or inadequate parents.  Id. 
 155. Id. at 463 (“The researchers thus urged that, ‘in the interests of the child’s emo-
tional well-being,’ parental visitation should be encouraged.” (citation omitted)). 
 156. See Grotevant, supra note 135, at 380. 
 157. Karie M. Frasch et al., Openness and Contact in Foster Care Adoptions: An Eight-Year Fol-
low-Up, 49 FAM. REL. 435, 445 (2000).  
 158. Id. at 443.  The research consisted of three waves of questionnaires mailed to adop-
tive parents at two, four, and eight years following adoption.  Id. at 436–37.  Although the 
original pool of adoptive parents willing to participate in the study was over 2,000 and in-
cluded non-foster care adoptions, by the completion of the study, the final sample con-
sisted solely of questionnaires completed by adoptive parents of former foster children and 
included 231 questionnaires.  Id.  Out of the 231 adoptions, the mean length of time the 
children had spent in foster care prior to being adopted was approximately two-and-a-half 
years, and 90 percent of the children were placed in the adoptive homes before the age of 
five.  Id.  The researchers observed that most children in the study were adopted as infants 
but that older children who are adopted may have a “greater interest in maintaining con-
tact” with their biological parents because they had had relationships with the biological 
parents prior to the adoption.  Id. at 444.  
 159. Id. at 443.  Almost 40 percent of families began as closed adoptions, having no con-
tact with the biological parents of the adopted children, and remained that way within the 
following eight years.  Id.  Approximately 25 percent of families began as open adoptions 
and continued to have some contact with the biological parents.  Id.  The remaining 35 
percent of families have either begun having contact with the biological parents even 
though there was no contact initially or stopped contact that used to exist.  Id.   
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 445. 
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Therefore, from the standpoint of psychology, to meet the best inter-
est of the child, one must strive to maintain all of these important re-
lationships in a child’s life.  
2.  The Law Presumes That the Legal Parent Acts in the Child’s Best 
Interest, Unless the Parent Is Unfit or There Are Exceptional 
Circumstances Overcoming the Presumption  
Although a psychologist would argue that a child’s attachment to 
the primary caretaker and the connection to the biological parents 
should dictate a child placement decision, psychology is not the 
courts’ only guide in cases in which a third party seeks to infringe on 
the legal parent’s relationship with his or her child.  Instead, courts 
presume that parents always promote the child’s best interests be-
cause historically courts have believed “that natural bonds of affection 
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”162
a.  The Law Recognizes the Legal Parents’ Liberty Interest in the 
Care, Custody, and Control of Their Children and Presumes 
That Parents Always Act in Their Children’s Best Interests  
  The pre-
sumption that parent knows best, however, may be overcome by a 
showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances making 
the parental prerogative detrimental to the child’s best interest. 
The relationship between a parent and a child occupies a special 
place in the law.  The Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he history 
and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of paren-
tal concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.”163  The 
presumption that parents are the best persons to decide what is in 
their children’s best interest is “established beyond debate as an en-
during American tradition.”164  Although the federal and state consti-
tutions are silent with regard to the parent’s right to parent, in fur-
therance of the traditional belief that parents act in their children’s 
best interest, the Court has recognized this fundamental right under 
the Fourteenth Amendment,165 which protects against state depriva-
tion “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”166
 
 162. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (citations omitted). 
  
 163. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (explaining that the Four-
teenth Amendment protected an individual’s liberty interest to “bring up children”). 
 166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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The evolution of parental rights jurisprudence began in Meyer v. 
Nebraska, where the Court considered the constitutionality of a state 
ordinance that prohibited instruction in a foreign language to stu-
dents who had not passed the eighth grade.167  Acknowledging the 
State’s interest in having all citizens speak English, the Court insisted 
that “the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be 
respected,” including the parents’ decision regarding their children’s 
education.168
[d]enotes . . . the right of the individual to . . . engage in any 
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful know-
ledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own con-
science, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.
  The Court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
liberty interest  
169
Two decades later, in Prince v. Massachusetts, while reaffirming 
parental rights, the Court established that such rights were not with-
out limitations.
 
170  In Prince, a woman was convicted for violating the 
state child labor laws for engaging her nine-year-old niece in the sale 
of religious pamphlets.171  Although the Court stated that “[i]t is car-
dinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside 
first in the parents,” it nevertheless held the state’s restriction on the 
parental rights in this case was constitutional.172  The Court reasoned 
that the “rights of parenthood are not beyond limitation,” and “the 
state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring 
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor and in 
many other ways.”173
 
 167. 262 U.S. 390, 396–97 (1923).  The suit was brought by a school teacher who was 
convicted under the statute for teaching reading in German to a student who had not 
passed the eighth grade.  Id.  
   
 168. Id. at 401, 399. 
 169. Id. at 399.  Just two years later, the Supreme Court was asked again to resolve a dis-
pute between the parents and the State in the education context in Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 529–30 (1925).  Pierce involved a state law that required parents to send to 
public schools all children between the ages of eight and sixteen.  Id.  The Court held that 
the law “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control.”  Id. at 534–35.   
 170. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 171. Id. at 159–60, 162. 
 172. Id. at 166. 
 173. Id.  (footnotes omitted).   
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The reasoning of Meyer, establishing the fundamental right to 
parent on the one hand, and Prince, acknowledging the right yet sub-
jecting it to the State’s authority to limit that right on the other hand, 
appeared in the context of the termination of parental rights in Stan-
ley v. Illinois.174  Stanley addressed the constitutionality of an Illinois law 
that automatically determined the custody of children of unwed fa-
thers upon the death of the children’s mother.175  While the Court 
did “not question the assertion that neglectful parents may be sepa-
rated from their children,” it found that the Illinois law violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it 
treated unwed fathers differently from other parents.176  Accordingly, 
the Court held that the State could only assume custody of children 
after a hearing and upon proof that the unwed father was an unfit 
parent.177
Even more recently, the Court has reaffirmed that “the interest 
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is per-
haps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court.”
 
178  In Troxel v. Granville, the Court reviewed a court’s award of 
visitation rights to grandparents under a statute that allowed any third 
party to petition for visitation with a child over the parent’s objection 
and authorized a court to grant visitation rights when visitation is in 
the child’s best interest.179  Declining to declare the statute unconsti-
tutional, the Court nevertheless found the state court’s decision 
granting visitation to grandparents violated the mother’s fundamental 
rights because it failed to give proper weight to her decision.180
Thus, in the past century, the Supreme Court has established 
“that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in caring for and 
guiding their children, and a corresponding privacy interest—absent 
exceptional circumstances—in doing so without the undue interfe-
   
 
 174. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  
 175. Id. at 646.  In contrast to the law’s relaxed standard with respect to unwed fathers, 
the State assumed custody of children of unwed mothers; divorced, separated, and wi-
dowed fathers; and adoptive parents only after a hearing and upon showing of neglect.  Id. 
 176. Id. at 652, 658. 
 177. Id. at 658.  Ten years later, in Santosky v. Kramer, the Court was presented with an 
opportunity to determine the standard of proof necessary for a showing of parental unfit-
ness.  455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982).  After weighing the parent’s interest of preserving familial 
ties against the State’s “parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of 
the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such 
proceedings,” the Court concluded that a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof 
is consistent with both interests.  Id. at 753–54, 758–60, 766–67, 758. 
 178. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
 179. Id. at 60.  
 180. Id. at 69–70. 
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rence of strangers to them and to their child.”181  At the same time, 
the Court has emphasized that the parental right is not absolute: 
when the parents’ liberty interest in raising their children as they see 
fit comes into conflict with the State’s parens patriae interest in pro-
moting the children’s best interests,182 the State or another third party 
may infringe on the parent’s right to parent, if it can overcome—by 
clear and convincing evidence183
b.  Courts May Substitute Their Own Judgment for That of a 
Parent When the Parent Is Unfit or There Are Exceptional 
Circumstances Giving Reason to Doubt the Parent Acts in the 
Child’s Best Interest  
—the presumption that the parent 
acts in the child’s best interest. 
Like the Supreme Court, Maryland courts also acknowledge that 
generally “the child’s interest is inextricably linked with the parents’ 
interest in and obligation for the welfare and health of the child.”184  
This presumption, however, “may be rebutted upon a showing either 
that the parent is ‘unfit’ or that ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist 
which would make continued custody with the parent detrimental to 
the best interest of the child.”185  The need to overcome the parental 
presumption is relevant in four types of cases: (1) third-party custody 
disputes, (2) third-party visitation cases, (3) termination of parental 
rights proceedings, and (4) contested adoption cases.186  In all four 
types of cases, Maryland courts use similar factors in deciding whether 
there are exceptional circumstances overcoming the presumption 
that parents act in their children’s best interests.187
 
 181. Id. at 60.    
 
 182. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 (explaining the conflicting interests in the context 
of the termination of parental rights). 
 183. Id. at 747–48. 
 184. See In re Yve S., 373 Md. 550, 572, 819 A.2d 1030, 1042 (2003) (citations and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 185. Rashawn, 402 Md. 477, 495, 937 A.2d 177, 188 (2007). 
 186. See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 675, 948 A.2d 73, 81 (2008) (identifying 
three circumstances in which the child’s best interest standard may arise: (1) custody dis-
putes between legal parents, (2) state proceedings in which the State acts in its parens pa-
triae capacity, and (3) third-party custody or visitation disputes); Ta’Niya, 417 Md. 90, 112, 
8 A.3d 745, 758 (2010) (stating that the child’s best interest is the governing standard even 
in TPR and contested adoption cases). 
 187. See infra Part I.B.2.b. 
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i.  Third-Party Custody and Visitation Cases 
Third-party custody and visitation cases have much in common.  
First, neither custody nor visitation orders are permanent, but they 
are subject to modification upon a showing of a material change in 
the circumstances.188  Second, courts consider visitation to be “a spe-
cies of custody, albeit for a different duration.”189
With regard to both third-party custody and visitation cases, the 
Court of Appeals has noted “that exceptional circumstances are not 
established through a rigid test, but rather by an analysis of all of the 
factors before the court in a particular case.”
  Not surprisingly 
then, in determining whether there are exceptional circumstances 
warranting the court’s intrusion into the parent’s decisions regarding 
what is in the child’s best interest, courts use similar approaches in 
these two types of cases.   
190  In many earlier third-
party custody cases, Maryland courts did not rely on a specific list of 
factors but found exceptional circumstances overcoming parental 
preference on the grounds of the child’s general emotional well-
being.191
In 1977 in Ross v. Hoffman, however, the Court of Appeals for the 
first time set forth a comprehensive list of exceptional circumstances 
factors,
  This often happened in cases where children were in the 
care of third parties for a significant period of time, thereby forming a 
strong attachment to the third parties who cared for them.  
192
 
 188. Barrett v. Ayres, 186 Md. App. 1, 18, 972 A.2d 905, 915 (2009). 
 on which courts have since relied, supplementing it with 
 189. Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 429, 921 A.2d 171, 185 (2007). 
 190. Janice M., 404 Md. at 693, 948 A.2d at 92. 
 191. See, e.g., Piotrowski v. State, 179 Md. 377, 383, 18 A.2d 199, 201–02 (1941) (award-
ing custody to maternal grandparents over the father’s objections because removal of the 
child from the grandparents’ home, where the child lived from infancy till the age of 
eight, may have been “injurious” and “detrimental” to the child); Dietrich v. Anderson, 
185 Md. 103, 106–08, 43 A.2d 186, 187–88, 193 (1945) (refusing to modify a custody de-
cree, thereby leaving custody with third parties who cared for the child from the age of ten 
months to five years, while the father first pursued an education and then a career in the 
Army Air Corps); Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 419, 423, 140 A.2d 660, 662 (1958) (leav-
ing the child in the custody of maternal grandparents despite the father’s objections be-
cause the child “has had no opportunity to develop real attachment to her father, step-
mother, and half-brother,” and “the mere contemplation of the change [of custody] 
produced a serious emotional upset” in the child); Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 189–
90, 148 A.2d 387, 390 (1959) (awarding custody to the third parties in fear that a change 
of custody after so many years would cause the child “emotional upset” but ordering that 
the child “see and get to know well her siblings and her father”).  
 192. 280 Md. 172, 191, 372 A.2d 582, 592–93 (1977).  In Ross, the child lived with the 
third parties—the Hoffmans—from the age of three-and-a-half months to eight-and-a-half 
years, seeing the mother only occasionally.  Id. at 181–82, 372 A.2d at 588–89.  As a result, 
the child and the Hoffmans developed “a bond of mutual attachment,” and the child 
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additional factors, as necessary.193  The Ross factors include (1) the 
length of time the parent and the child were separated, (2) the age of 
the child when the child was first separated from the parent, (3) the 
attachment between the child and the third party who cared for the 
child during the separation of the child from the biological parent, 
(4) the length of time it took the biological parent to attempt to rec-
laim the child, (5) the stability of the biological parent’s household, 
and (6) the genuineness of the biological parent’s desire to have cus-
tody of the child.194
In third-party visitation cases, Maryland courts initially did not 
give any special weight to the parents’ decision concerning visitation 
and delved directly into the child’s best interest analysis.
   
195  However, 
in Koshko v. Haining, the Court of Appeals began to require that a 
grandparent who is challenging a parental decision with regard to vi-
sitation must demonstrate parental unfitness or exceptional circums-
tances.196  Reviewing the constitutionality of Maryland’s grandparent 
visitation statute (“GVS”)197  the Koshko court held that because “visita-
tion is a species of custody, albeit for a more limited duration,”198 the 
parental decisions regarding visitation must receive the same constitu-
tional protections as custody determinations.199
 
viewed the Hoffmans as her parents.  Id. at 183, 372 A.2d at 589.  Not surprisingly, “[w]hen 
the mother attempted to reclaim the child, the child’s reaction ‘was one of emotional 
upheaval[, and s]he was under emotional stress.’”  Id. at 182, 372 A.2d at 589.  A psychiatr-
ist testified at trial that “he did not feel that it was in the best interests of the child to place 
her in the custody of her biological mother because the child viewed Mrs. Hoffman psy-
chologically as the mother.”  Id. at 182–83, 372 A.2d at 589.  With this evidence, the Court 
of Appeals concluded that there were ample grounds for the family court to find excep-
tional circumstances making custody with the biological mother detrimental to the child’s 
best interest.  Id. at 192, 372 A.2d at 594. 
  To save the GVS from 
 193. Aumiller v. Aumiller, 183 Md. App. 71, 80–81, 959 A.2d 849, 854–55 (2008).  
 194. Ross, 280 Md. at 191, 372 A.2d at 593.  
 195. See, e.g., Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 47–48, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993) (hold-
ing that a threshold showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances is not re-
quired in grandparent visitation cases), overruled in part by Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 
445, 921 A.2d 171, 195 (2007).  
 196. 398 Md. 404, 444–45, 921 A.2d 171, 195 (2007). 
 197. GVS hinges upon the child’s best interest without requiring the threshold finding 
regarding parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances.  Id. at 424, 921 A.2d at 182. 
 198. Id. at 429, 921 A.2d at 185.     
 199. Id. at 444–45, 921 A.2d at 195.  The court explained:  
There is no dispute that the grant or modification of visitation involves a lesser 
degree of intrusion on the fundamental right to parent than the assignment of 
custody. . . .  [A]lthough there may be a difference in the degree of intrusion, it 
is not a difference of constitutional magnitude.  Visitation, like custody, intrudes 
upon the fundamental right of parents to direct the “care, custody, and control” 
of their children.  Though visitation decisions granting such privileges to third 
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being declared facially unconstitutional, the court engrafted into the 
statute the presumption that the parents’ decision regarding visitation 
was in the child’s best interest.200  Thus, the court held that before 
grandparents could challenge parental decisions prohibiting or limit-
ing visitation, they must show either parental unfitness or exceptional 
circumstances.201
Although Maryland courts have yet to develop a list of factors to 
consider in making exceptional circumstances determinations in 
third-party visitation cases, the many similarities between third-party 
custody and visitation matters mean that the same factors courts use 
in third-party custody cases “may be relevant” in the visitation context 
as well.
   
202  For instance, evidence of “a long and frequent history of 
visitation” and “lay and/or expert evidence of a detrimental physical 
or emotional effect on the children as a result of the cessation of visi-
tation” are some of the factors a court may consider in third-party visi-
tation cases.203
ii.  Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings  
   
The exceptional circumstances analysis in TPR proceedings is 
even more important than the analysis in the third-party custody and 
visitation cases because termination of parental rights “does not just 
allocate access to a child but constitutes a total rescission of the legal 
relationship between parent and child, and that rescission is generally 
final.”204  The TPR statute groups exceptional circumstances factors 
into four major categories.205
 
parties may tread more lightly into the protected grove of parental rights, they 
tread nonetheless.   
  The first category focuses on the servic-
es provided by the Department of Social Services to the parent in an 
effort to reunify the parent and the child and the parents’ compliance 
Id. at 430–31, 921 A.2d at 186 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 200. Id. at 426, 921 A.2d at 184. 
 201. Id. at 444–45, 921 A.2d at 195. 
 202. Aumiller v. Aumiller, 183 Md. App. 71, 84–85, 959 A.2d 849, 857 (2008). 
 203. Id. at 85, 959 A.2d at 857.  Lack of visitation, in and of itself, however, is not 
enough to establish exceptional circumstances.  Id.  Instead, the party challenging the pa-
rental decision to limit or prohibit visitation must present evidence, often in the form of 
expert testimony, that “harm . . . results or likely will result from the refusal to provide visi-
tation.”  Id.  
 204. Rashawn, 402 Md. 477, 496, 937 A.2d 177, 188 (2007).  Additionally, unlike with 
custody and visitation disputes where the State plays a neutral role, in termination of pa-
rental rights proceedings, the State is the moving party.  Id. 
 205. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-323 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010).  
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with the department’s requirements.206  The second category com-
bines a number of considerations evaluating the parent’s efforts and 
success in adjusting his or her circumstances, such as the parent’s 
maintenance of contact with the child and the department and finan-
cial contributions to the child’s support.207  The third category looks 
into any past child abuse or neglect by the parent, whether the child 
was drug-positive at birth, the parent’s convictions for a crime of vi-
olence against parents and children, and whether the parent’s paren-
tal rights have been previously involuntarily terminated.208  The 
fourth category considers the child’s emotional well-being by examin-
ing (1) “the child’s emotional ties with and feelings toward the child’s 
parents, the child’s siblings, and others who may affect the child’s best 
interests significantly;” (2) the child’s adjustment to the new home, 
school, and community; (3) “the child’s feelings about severance of 
the parent-child relationship;” and (4) “the likely impact of terminat-
ing parental rights on the child’s well-being.”209
Although many of these exceptional circumstances factors ap-
pear to focus on the parent, as opposed to the child, in two of its re-
cent TPR decisions—Alonza and In re Adoption/Guardianship of Ta’Niya 
S.—the Court of Appeals emphasized that, in determining whether 
there are exceptional circumstances, courts must focus on the child’s 
best interest.
  
210  In Alonza, Alonza and Shaydon were placed in foster 
care at a young age because their father’s house tested positive for the 
presence of lead.211
 
 206. Id. § 5-323(d)(1).  Section 5-706 of the Maryland Family Law Article requires the 
local Department of Social Services to investigate any reports of child abuse or neglect. Id. 
§ 5-706. Depending on the results of its investigation, the department may remove the 
child from the parents’ custody and file a petition requesting that the court find the child 
in need of assistance (“CINA”).  See MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. § 3-809, § 3-811 
(West 2006 & Supp. 2010).  If the court adjudicates the child CINA, the department would 
either place the child with a suitable family member or in foster care.  Id. § 3-819.  After 
the child’s removal from the parents’ custody, the department is required to provide rea-
sonable efforts to aid the parent in reunifying with the child.  Id. § 3-802. 
  The boys had a “close” and “positive relationship” 
 207. FAM. LAW § 5-323(d)(2)(i)–(ii).  Under this category, courts may also take into ac-
count any parental disability that would make the parent unable to care for the child and 
whether any additional services would aid the parent in making the required changes so 
that the parent and the child could be reunified within eighteen months.  Id. § 5-
323(d)(2)(iii)–(iv). 
 208. Id. § 5-323(d)(3). 
 209. Id. § 5-323(d)(4). 
 210. Alonza, 412 Md. 442, 468, 987 A.2d 536, 551–52 (2010); Ta’Niya, 417 Md. 90, 116, 8 
A.3d 745, 761 (2010). 
 211. See Alonza, 412 Md. at 444, 987 A.2d at 537.  Alonza and Shaydon lived with their 
biological parents until the parents separated when Alonza and Shaydon were sixteen 
months and two months old respectively.  Id.  At first, the children went to live with their 
mother, but because of a neglect allegation, the Baltimore City Department of Social Ser-
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with their father, Mr. D., who visited them regularly.212  When Alonza 
was seven years old and Shaydon was five-and-a-half, however, Mr. D.’s 
parental rights were terminated in order to free the boys for adoption 
by their foster mother.213  The juvenile court terminated Mr. D.’s pa-
rental rights finding exceptional circumstances based on the length of 
time the boys lived with the foster mother but without an explicit find-
ing of how this length of time related to their best interest.214  Al-
though Mr. D.’s parental rights were ultimately terminated,215 the 
Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court’s initial finding of excep-
tional circumstances based on the length of time alone, holding 
that—absent a specific finding of a detriment to the children’s best 
interest—neither the length of time in foster care nor the resulting 
bond between the children and the foster mother amounted to ex-
ceptional circumstances warranting termination of parental rights.216
Likewise, in Ta’Niya the court held that, in determining whether 
there are exceptional circumstances, the child’s best interests 
“trump[] all other considerations.”
  
217  In Ta’Niya, the juvenile court 
denied the local department’s Petition for Guardianship, reasoning 
the mother’s inability to fully comply with the department’s require-
ments did not rise to the level of exceptional circumstances warrant-
ing termination of parental rights.218
 
vices removed them from her custody.  Id.  The department considered placing the boys 
with Mr. D., but the house where Mr. D. was residing at the time tested positive for the 
presence of lead.  Id. 
  The Court of Appeals reversed, 
however, holding that the juvenile court improperly focused on the 
 212. Id. at 445–47, 987 A.2d at 538–39.   
 213. Id. at 444, 450, 987 A.2d at 537, 540. 
 214. Id. at 468, 987 A.2d at 551–52. 
 215. This case has a complex procedural history. There were several termination of pa-
rental rights hearings and several appeals.  The Court of Appeals remanded the juvenile 
court’s ruling twice.  First, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the juvenile court 
on February 15, 2008.  In re Adoption/Guardianship of Alonza Lynn D., Jr., 403 Md. 424, 
424, 942 A.2d 755 (2008).  The second time the court remanded the case to the juvenile 
court was on January 19, 2010.  Alonza, 412 Md. at 468, 987 A.2d at 552).  In May 2011 the 
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s latest TPR finding in the case.  In re 
Adoption/Guardianship of Alonza D. and Shayon S., No. 2089, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. May 24, 2011).  No certiorari petition has been filed in the Court of Appeals.   
 216. Alonza, 412 Md. at 460–61, 987 A.2d at 547.  In Ta’Niya, the Court of Appeals clari-
fied Alonza as holding that “[f]or exceptional circumstances to exist, the court must also 
find that the passage of time when the parent and the child were apart makes continuation 
of parental relationship detrimental to the best interest of the child.”  Ta’Niya, 417 Md. 90, 
112, 8 A.3d 745, 758 (2010) (citing Alonza, 412 Md. at 463, 987 A.2d at 548).  
 217. Ta’Niya, 417 Md. at 111, 8 A.3d at 758. 
 218. Id. at 112, 8 A.3d at 759.  Further, the court did not think it was appropriate to 
terminate the mother’s parental rights to Ta’Niya when the department returned 
Ta’Niya’s older sister to the mother’s care.  Id. at 115, 8 A.3d at 760. 
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mother, as opposed to the child, in determining whether exceptional 
circumstances existed.219
iii.  Contested Adoption Cases 
  Thus, when courts apply the statutory provi-
sions of section 5-323 to determine whether exceptional circums-
tances warranting termination of parental rights exist, they must focus 
on the child’s best interest.   
In the adoption context, the need to overcome the presumption 
that a continued parental relationship is in the child’s best interest 
arises in cases where one parent wants to place the child for adoption 
but the other parent contests that decision.220  Although adoption 
proceedings, like TPR proceedings, carry with them a finality that is 
not present in third-party custody and visitation cases, the court’s ex-
ceptional circumstances analysis in those cases is more similar to 
third-party custody cases than to TPR proceedings.221  Unlike the ex-
ceptional factors courts consider in TPR proceedings, the exceptional 
circumstances factors in contested adoption cases are not codified but 
are derived from common law.222  As with third-party custody and visi-
tation cases, the exceptional circumstances a court would consider in 
contested adoptions depend on the facts of a particular case.223
 
 219. Id., 8 A.3d at 760–61.  Criticizing the juvenile court for its preoccupation solely 
with the mother’s compliance or noncompliance with the service agreements and the 
mother’s relationship with her other daughter, the Court of Appeals observed that the ju-
venile court failed to inquire into Ta’Niya’s emotional ties or lack thereof to the biological 
mother and sister and Ta’Niya’s feelings regarding termination of her mother’s parental 
rights.  Id. at 116, 8 A.3d at 760–61.  The court concluded:   
  Nev-
Such a characterization of the exceptional circumstances analysis is incorrect as 
it does not take into account circumstances particular to an individual child. A 
court may reach different conclusions under FL Section 5-323(d) regarding dif-
ferent children of the same parent. Indeed, as the facts of this case demonstrate, 
a parent may, for example, have regular and frequent contact with one child, but 
not the other, and have varying degrees of success in completion of different ser-
vice agreements with respect to each child. Also, depending on the age at which 
the children of one parent were placed in foster care, the length of time they 
spent in foster care, and the frequency of contact with the natural parent, one 
child may have maintained or formed an attachment to the natural parent, while 
the other child has not. 
Id., 8 A.3d at 760. 
 220. See, e.g., In re Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 542–43, 640 A.2d 
1085, 1087 (1994) [hereinafter In re A91-71A] (the biological father contesting indepen-
dent adoption).  
 221. See id. at 559–61, 640 A.2d at 1096–97 (observing that the third-party custody ex-
ceptional factors apply in contested adoptions). 
 222. See id. at 561–64, 640 A.2d at 1097–98 (reviewing precedents addressing exception-
al circumstances). 
 223. Id. at 561, 640 A.2d at 1096. 
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ertheless, courts often rely on factors similar to those enumerated in 
the seminal third-party custody case Ross v. Hoffman.224
For instance, as with third-party custody cases, in contested adop-
tion cases courts have considered (1) “the length of time that a child 
has been with the prospective adoptive parents and the strength of 
the attachment between the child and the prospective adoptive par-
ents,” (2) “the relative stability of the child’s future with the natural 
parent and with the prospective adoptive parents,” and (3) “the rela-
tive effect upon the child’s stability of having one, as opposed to 
another, or both, of the relationships continue.”
  
225  Additionally, the 
Court of Appeals has observed that other third-party custody consid-
erations, such as “the sincerity of the natural parent’s desire to rear 
the child, the age of the child when care was assumed by the third 
party, and the emotional effect of the adoption upon the child” may 
be relevant in a contested adoption case.226  Beyond these factors, in 
contested adoption cases courts have also considered the biological 
parent’s behavior toward the child, as demonstrated by the parent’s 
visitation and support of the child on one hand and abandonment on 
the other.227
The third-party custody, visitation, TPR proceedings, and con-
tested adoption cases demonstrate that when a legal parent’s deci-
sions concerning the child’s upbringing are at odds with a third par-
ty’s interests, the law seeks to protect the relationship between the 
child and his or her legal parent because it presumes that the parent 
is the best person to decide what is in the child’s best interest.  Courts 
may, however, substitute their own judgment for that of a parent if 
there are exceptional circumstances demonstrating that parental 
judgment is detrimental to the child’s best interest.  In determining 
whether there are exceptional circumstances, courts must focus on 
the child’s best interest.  
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Psychology teaches us that continuity of attachments and integri-
ty of bonds play a crucial role in children’s ability to form and main-
tain healthy attachments in adulthood and to grow into happy and 
productive adults.  From the psychology standpoint, then, allowing 
attachments to endure and keeping the biological bonds intact is in 
 
 224. 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977). 
 225. In re A91-71A, 334 Md. at 561, 640 A.2d at 1097.  
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 562–63, 640 A.2d at 1097. 
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the child’s best interest.228  Applying this rationale to the legal context 
means that foster children should be able to continue to have contact 
with their biological parents after termination of their parental rights 
and after the subsequent adoption.229  Under the current statutory 
framework, however, even if courts order post-termination contact, 
such orders do not survive adoption, and courts lack the inherent au-
thority to order post-adoption contact.230  As a result, in cases where 
the adoptive parent does not wish for the contact between the 
adopted child and his or her biological parents to continue after the 
adoption, courts are without power to intervene even if the adoptive 
parents’ stance with regard to visitation is detrimental to the child’s 
best interest.231
To allow courts to fully carry out the State’s parens patriae respon-
sibility of promoting the child’s welfare, the legislature must create a 
statutory scheme that would allow post-termination visitation orders 
to survive adoption in cases where continuing visitation would be in 
the child’s best interest.
  
232  The General Assembly could do that by 
amending the current TPR and adoption laws to allow courts to ex-
tend the effect of post-termination visitation orders past adoption.  
Before post-termination visitation orders turn into post-adoption visi-
tation orders, however, courts would need to find exceptional cir-
cumstances making the adoptive parents’ decision not to allow con-
tact between the adopted children and their biological parents to be 
detrimental to the child’s best interest.233  If the General Assembly 
expressly requires such a finding, the proposed post-adoption contact 
legislation will survive a constitutional challenge.234
A.  From the Standpoint of Psychology, Post-Termination and Post-
Adoption Contact with the Biological Parents Is Often in the 
Child’s Best Interest  
  
From the psychology standpoint, post-termination and post-
adoption contact with biological parents may be in the best interests 
of many adopted foster children because it would allow them to pre-
serve their attachment to their biological parents, if any, and give 
them an opportunity to stay connected to their socio-genealogical 
 
 228. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 229. See infra Part II.A. 
 230. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 231. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 232. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 233. See infra Part II.B.3.b. 
 234. See infra Part II.B.3.b.iii. 
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roots.  By the time many foster children are removed from their bio-
logical parents’ care—even in cases of abuse and neglect—those 
children had probably formed an attachment to their parents.235  Se-
verance of that attachment—although often necessary for the child’s 
physical well-being236—is inevitably detrimental for the child’s emo-
tional well-being.237  While the biological parent’s visitation during 
the child’s stay in foster care probably diminishes the negative effect 
of separation,238
Even if the child has no attachment to the biological parent ei-
ther because the child had been taken away from the parent before 
he or she had had an opportunity to form an attachment
 termination of parental rights and the subsequent 
adoption with no further contact with the biological parent would ab-
ruptly sever that important connection.   
239 or be-
cause the child’s attachment to the parent was disrupted,240 post-
termination and post-adoption contact with the biological parent may 
still be beneficial to the child as it would preserve the child’s socio-
genealogical connection to the child’s roots.241
 
 235. See, e.g., OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 
  The fact that the 
77, at 54 (“The importance of the biological 
parent’s value to the child’s emotional welfare is even more dramatically demonstrated in 
child abuse cases: All [child protection workers] who have been involved when children 
are removed from a home have witnessed how youngsters cling even to abusing parents . . . 
[and] seen children run away from adequate foster homes to inadequate parental 
homes.”) (alterations in original) (citations omitted); Douglas F. Goldsmith et al., Separa-
tion and Reunification: Using Attachment Theory and Research to Inform Decisions Affecting the 
Placements of Children in Foster Care, 55 JUV. & FAM. COURT J. 1, 6 (2004) (“Professionals 
seem to ignore that for the child the maltreating parents are the only parents he or she 
has, and that any separation, particularly if long and abrupt, will evoke strong and painful 
emotional reactions.”).  
 236. See, e.g., Rashawn, 402 Md. 477, 481–83, 937 A.2d 177, 180–81 (2007) (describing 
Rashawn’s and Terese’s lives with their biological parents when the children moved eleven 
times from and to “various shelters and finally ended up in a roach and rat-infested apart-
ment, where [the parents] had to take turns staying awake at night to guard the children 
from the noxious animals”).  
 237. See supra note 235. 
 238. See Margaret Smariga, Visitation with Infants and Toddlers in Foster Care: What Judges 
and Attorneys Need to Know, 1, 6 (2007), http://main.zerotothree.org/site/DocServer 
/Visitation_with_Infants_and_Toddlers_in_Foster_Care.pdf?docID=3981 (arguing, among 
other things, that frequent and meaningful visitation “[p]romotes healthy attachment and 
reduces the negative effects of separation for the child and parents”).  
 239. See, e.g., Alonza, 412 Md. 442, 444, 987 A.2d 536, 537 (2010) (stating that at the 
time Shaydon was placed in foster care, he was two months old). 
 240. The separation of the child from the parent, however, does not necessarily lead to 
a disruption of the child’s attachment to the parent.  See Goldsmith, supra note 237, at 1 
(stating that during the stay in foster care, “children find themselves torn between forming 
an attachment to their foster parents while simultaneously longing to return to their par-
ents”).   
 241. OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 73–74 (citations omitted).  Professionals often 
misinterpret a child’s behavior during separation as an indication that continuation of 
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child’s prospective adoptive parent has become or is likely to become 
the child’s “psychological parent”242 does not diminish the child’s 
need for maintaining a connection to his or her socio-genealogical 
heritage.243
Alonza
  
244 presents a factual situation where post-severance contact 
with the biological parent would have likely been in the children’s 
best interests for at least three reasons.245  First, prior to Alonza’s 
placement in foster care, he had been in his biological father’s, Mr. 
D.’s, care for sixteen months.246  Although to adults this may seem like 
a very young age of which Alonza would have little or no recollection, 
as the attachment theory demonstrates, infancy is a crucial time for an 
individual’s attachment formation.247  Regardless of the instability of 
Alonza’s early life, when Alonza was first placed in foster care, he like-
ly suffered emotionally as a result of the separation from his only at-
tachment figures.248  Regular visitation with Mr. D. over the following 
years in foster care likely helped Alonza cope with the separation and 
to transition smoothly into a new life with the foster mother.249  Visita-
tion by Mr. D. probably also allowed the attachment to endure.  In 
circumstances like these, another severance of a child’s attachment 
may disturb the child’s emotional well-being, further challenging his 
or her ability to form healthy attachments, pursue new endeavors, and 
deal with negative emotions that life brings.250
Second, regardless of whether Alonza and Shaydon had an at-
tachment to Mr. D., the boys’ socio-genealogical connection to their 
biological father cannot be negated.  Alonza and Shaydon’s contact 
with Mr. D. during their time in foster care provided them an oppor-
  
 
contact with the parent has a detrimental effect when the opposite is true.  See Goldsmith, 
supra note 237, at 2–3 (“[T]he behavior of a foster child who returns from a visit with his 
biological parents and destroys his room, wets on the floor, and experiences nightmares 
may incorrectly be interpreted to indicate that the child was subjected to abuse or harsh 
parenting during the visit.  In fact, such emotional dysregulation following contact with 
the biological parents may be a reasonable, if not expected, response from a child who is 
once again being forced to cope with an unwanted separation.”). 
 242. See supra note 101. 
 243. But see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 101, at 11–13 (arguing the blood connection is of no 
relevance to children).  
 244. Alonza, 412 Md. 442, 987 A.2d 536 (2010).   
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 7–12 & 214–216. 
 246. Alonza, 412 Md. at 444, 987 A.2d at 537.  Shaydon was only two months old when 
he stopped living with Mr. D. and may have been too young to have formed an attachment 
to Mr. D. prior to the separation.  Id. 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 84–89.  
 248. See supra text accompanying notes 105–108.  
 249. See supra text accompanying note 238. 
 250. See supra text accompanying notes 90–100. 
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tunity to preserve a connection to their socio-genealogical roots.251  
This connection will probably prove to be even more beneficial to the 
boys when they begin to form their identities during early adoles-
cence.252  Because in circumstances like these the child’s adoptive 
parent would unlikely be able or willing to provide the child adequate 
socio-genealogical information, adopted foster children with no post-
adoption contact with their biological parents may experience a di-
minished sense of security, self-doubt, and the relentless need to get 
to their roots.253
Third, Mr. D. visited Alonza and Shaydon regularly while they 
were in foster care, and was eager to maintain the relationship with 
them.
 
254  Mr. D. also never engaged in child abuse, and the only bar-
rier to their reunification with Mr. D. was the presence of lead in the 
home where Mr. D. resided.255  Furthermore, although Mr. D. was un-
able to satisfy the Department of Social Service’s conditions for reuni-
fication with his children, he nevertheless demonstrated a strong de-
sire to get the boys back.256
As the Alonza facts demonstrate, in some cases, post-termination 
and post-adoption contact may be in the child’s best interest because 
it would preserve some children’s attachment to their first attachment 
figures—their biological parents—and help all children avoid “genea-
logical bewilderment” by staying connected to their biological roots.  
Such contact would be particularly important in cases like Alonza, 
where (1) the children are older at the time of the termination of the 
  Thus, like Mr. D., some parents whose 
parental rights were terminated—if allowed to have post-adoption 
contact with their children—would pose no threat to the children’s 
safety and would likely maintain contact with them after adoption.   
 
 251. See OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 73–74 (emphasizing that benefits of contact 
between children and parents from whom they have been separated “seem[] to derive 
more from the quantity and/or quality of socio-genealogical information which the child 
gains from such contact than from contact itself”). 
 252. See supra text accompanying notes 130–131. 
 253. See OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 44 (discussing studies suggesting that the “in-
tellectual, emotional and behavioral difficulties experienced by many adopted children 
[may be attributed] to the loss of genealogical continuity”). 
 254. Alonza, 412 Md. 442, 445, 447, 987 A.2d 536, 538, 539 (2010).   
 255. Id. at 444–45, 987 A.2d at 537–38.  The circumstances of Alonza and Shaydon’s se-
paration from their biological parents are not exceptional: “Experts estimate that 40 to 70 
percent of children currently in foster care have not been abused and would not need to 
be separated from their families if society sufficiently assisted poor families in raising their 
children.”  GUGGENHEIM, supra note 43, at 192. 
 256. In terminating Mr. D.’s parental rights, the juvenile court observed, “It does appear 
as if [the father] was trying his best, I just don’t think he quite made it.”  Alonza, 412 Md. at 
448, 987 A.2d at 539.   
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biological parent’s parental rights, (2) the children had lived with the 
biological parent for a significant length of time prior to the child’s 
removal from the parent’s home or had had regular contact with the 
biological parent during the child’s stay in foster care, and (3) the bi-
ological parent is determined to continue the relationship with the 
child after the termination of parental rights and the subsequent 
adoption.  
B.  Maryland Courts Should Be Able to Require Post-Termination and 
Post-Adoption Contact with Biological Parents When It Would Be in 
the Best Interest of the Adopted Foster Children 
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the State of Maryland—
through its courts—should promote child welfare by following the re-
search in the field of psychology, which demonstrates the benefits of 
contact between children and their biological parents, and requires 
such contact following the severance of the legal parent/child rela-
tionship.  Maryland’s TPR statutes already allow courts to order visita-
tion following termination of parental rights in cases where visitation 
would be in the child’s best interest.257  But despite evidence that such 
contact would be beneficial for the child’s psychological well-being, 
juvenile courts have not ordered post-termination contact258 and have 
no express or inherent authority to extend post-termination visitation 
orders post-adoption.259  Thus, legislative action is necessary for any 
meaningful change in the lives of those foster children who are 
adopted following termination of their biological parents’ parental 
rights.260
The General Assembly should authorize courts to extend the ef-
fect of post-termination visitation orders past adoption by amending 
the TPR and adoption laws to allow adoption courts to review the ap-
propriateness of a post-termination visitation order.
   
261  Although such 
legislation would fall within the State’s parens patriae authority, the 
General Assembly must be mindful that any post-adoption visitation 
legislation does not infringe on the adoptive parents’ fundamental 
right to raise their children as they see fit.262
 
 257. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(5) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
  New legislation would 
avoid such a constitutional challenge if, as a prerequisite to ordering 
post-adoption contact, the legislation requires courts to find excep-
 258. See infra note 265.  
 259. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 260. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 261. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 262. See infra Part I.B.2.a. 
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tional circumstances overcoming the presumption that the adoptive 
parents’ decision against post-adoption contact is in their child’s best 
interest.263
1. Courts Should Use Their Authority to Order Post-Termination 
Contact in Cases Where It Would Be in the Child’s Best Interest 
  
The TPR laws already permit courts to order post-termination visi-
tation between a child and his or her biological parents when courts 
terminate those parents’ parental rights and give the Department of 
Social Services guardianship over the child.264  Despite this statutory 
authority, however, courts do not appear to order post-termination 
contact.265
First, the General Assembly gave courts authority to enter post-
termination orders when it overhauled the TPR and adoption laws by 
enacting the Permanency for Families and Children Act of 2005.  In 
allowing courts to order post-termination contact, section 5-324(b) 
does not specifically speak of the child’s biological parent whose 
rights have been terminated but instead broadly states that the court 
may “allow visitation for the child with a specific individual.”
  Courts may be reluctant to order post-termination contact 
between foster children and their biological parents because (1) the 
post-termination visitation provision is relatively recent and does not 
expressly refer to biological parents; (2) courts are of the opinion that 
termination of parental rights is not consistent with post-termination 
visitation; or (3) courts continue to follow the dispelled belief that 
closed adoption promotes the child’s well-being.  None of these three 
reasons, however, justifies denying children what is in their best inter-
est.  
266
 
 263. See infra Part II.B.3.b.iii. 
  Never-
theless, the General Assembly probably envisioned that courts would 
use that provision to order post-termination visitation between foster 
children and their biological family members, including parents, 
 264. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(5) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010).   
 265. The author was not successful in finding appellate cases reviewing the juvenile 
court’s granting or failure to grant post-termination visitation generally or with a biological 
parent specifically.  This may be attributed to the statute’s ambiguity.  See Annette R. Ap-
pell, Survey of State Utilization of Adoption with Contact, 6 ADOPTION Q. 75, 80 (2003) (observ-
ing that South Dakota’s post-adoption agreement statute is ambiguous, and “persons at 
South Dakota state and private agencies did not believe that their state permits enforce-
ment of post-adoption contact agreements” even though it does). 
 266. FAM. LAW § 5-324(b)(1)(ii)(5). 
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grandparents, and siblings.267  After all, it enacted this statute during 
the same legislative session and as part of the same legislation as the 
post-adoption visitation agreement statute.268
Second, although termination of parental rights and adoption 
previously constituted an all-or-nothing approach to child placements, 
that is no longer so.
 
269  Indeed, the General Assembly has recently be-
gun to authorize courts to order post-termination visitation in TPR 
proceedings.270  It has also begun to expressly provide that parties may 
enter into post-adoption visitation agreements enforceable in court,271 
and to require that any post-adoption agreements accompany peti-
tions for adoption.272  Many other jurisdictions have likewise enacted 
post-adoption visitation statutes,273
Third, the myth has long been dispelled that pretending as if the 
child’s biological parents and the child’s relationship with them never 
existed helps the child move on with his or her life following adop-
tion.  Since the “open adoption movement” first began in the early 
1970s, psychological studies and the adoptees’ personal accounts have 
increasingly demonstrated the numerous negative effects of closed 
adoptions on child development.
 making the all-or-nothing ap-
proach more of an exception than the norm.  
274
 
 267. It may have been more helpful if the General Assembly had expressly stated a “spe-
cific individual” includes the parent whose rights have been terminated.  For example, the 
Florida post-termination statute reads:  
  At the same time, awareness 
If the court terminates parental rights, it may, as appropriate, order that the par-
ents, siblings, or relatives of the parent whose rights are terminated be allowed to 
maintain some communication or contact with the child pending adoption if the 
best interests of the child support this continued communication or contact . . . .  
If the court orders such continued communication or contact, which may in-
clude, but is not limited to, visits, letters, and cards or telephone calls, the nature 
and frequency of the communication or contact must be set forth in written or-
der and may be reviewed upon motion of any party, or, for purposes of this sub-
section, an identified prospective adoptive parent.  If a child is placed for adop-
tion, the nature and frequency of the communication or contact must be 
reviewed by the court at the time the child is placed for adoption.   
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7)(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011).  
 268. Compare Legis. Notes accompanying MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-
324(b)(1)(ii)(5) (West 2006) (part of Acts 2005 c. 464), with Legis. Notes accompanying 
FAM. LAW § 5-308(a) (part of Acts 2005 c. 464).  
 269. See Appell, supra note 139, at 1–5 (discussing how adoption policies have changed 
since she began to represent foster children). 
 270. FAM. LAW § 5-324(b)(5) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 271. Id. § 5-308.   
 272. Id. § 5-345(c)(ii).  
 273. See Appell, supra note 139, at 27–32 (reporting on post-adoption statutes with con-
tact in twenty states). 
 274. See supra text accompany notes 126–131, 136–148. 
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about the benefits of post-adoption contact has increased among psy-
chologists, legislatures, and courts.275
2.  Post-Termination Visitation Orders Are Meaningless If They Do 
Not Extend Past Adoption but Maryland Courts Have No Express 
or Inherent Authority to Order Post-Adoption Contact 
  Therefore, if courts have any 
reservations about ordering post-termination visitation between child-
ren and their biological parents as part of the TPR proceeding, those 
reservations are unwarranted and must be abandoned for the sake of 
the children’s best interests.   
Ordering post-termination visitation when such visitation is in 
the child’s best interest is only a partial solution to the problem of se-
vered psychological and socio-genealogical connections between for-
mer foster children and their biological parents.  This is so because 
any post-termination order would be short-lived as it only has force 
while the child is under the guardianship of a local department of so-
cial services.  Once the court signs the adoption decree, it effectively 
terminates the child’s guardianship case and with it any post-
termination visitation order.276
Maryland courts lack any express or inherent authority, however, 
to order contact once adoption takes place.  Although the adoption 
laws expressly authorize prospective adoptive parents and biological 
parents to enter into an agreement to allow the child to continue to 
have contact with the biological parent or another relative following 
the adoption,
  Thus, for a post-termination visitation 
order to have any meaningful effect, courts must be able to extend its 
force beyond adoption.   
277 they are silent with regard to court-ordered post-
adoption contact.  Because the adoption laws do not authorize courts 
to order post-adoption contact in the absence of an agreement be-
tween the parties, courts have no express authority to order such con-
tact.278
Neither do courts possess any inherent power to order post-
adoption contact.  Maryland courts have long acknowledged that they 
possess certain inherent powers that enable them to carry out their 
   
 
 275. See generally Appell, supra note 139 (discussing the increasing awareness of open 
adoption benefits, as demonstrated by the growing number of post-adoption visitation 
agreement statutes). 
 276. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-328(c) (West 2006). 
 277. Id. § 5-308(a). 
 278. 1 MD. LAW ENCYC. § 51 (West 2009).  But see In re Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 
299–300 (Mass. 2000) (holding courts have equitable powers to order post-adoption visita-
tion to former parents).  
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judicial functions, such as, for example, the inherent authority to ad-
minister justice and to regulate the practice of law.279  Courts also pos-
sess certain inherent powers in the absence of statutory authorization 
if such powers existed at common law, such as, for example, the inhe-
rent power to award alimony.280  But because power to enter adoption 
decrees did not exist at common law,281
Furthermore, even though the Maryland courts have jurisdiction 
over child visitation generally,
 courts do not have any inhe-
rent powers pertaining to adoptions specifically.   
282 court-ordered post-adoption visita-
tion between the adopted child and his or her biological parent 
would run contrary to the express legislative intent of terminating all 
rights of former parents upon adoption.283  Indeed, under the Mary-
land adoption law, upon adoption, “each of the adoptee’s living par-
ents is: relieved of all parental duties and obligations to the adoptee; 
and divested of all parental rights as to the adoptee.”284  A post-
adoption order allowing visitation to a former parent, however, would 
preserve in the parent a visitation right, and would thus run contrary 
to the legislative intent.  Since the current adoption laws do not give 
courts express authority to order post-adoption contact between 
adopted children and their biological parents, and because courts do 
not have any inherent authority to enter such orders, to promote the 
child’s welfare, legislative action is necessary.285
 
 279. See Wynn v. State, 388 Md. 423, 431 & n.2, 879 A.2d 1097, 1102 & n.2 (2005) (cata-
loguing cases including Archer v. State, 383 Md. 329, 360, 859 A.2d 210, 229 (2004) (ad-
ministration of justice); Post v. Bregman, 349 Md. 142, 163, 707 A.2d 806, 816 (1998) 
(practice of law)).   
   
 280. Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. 605, 613, 451 A.2d 1215, 1219 (1982) (“As pointed 
out on many occasions, the 1777 statute merely confirmed the previously existing inherent 
authority of equity courts over the matter of alimony.”). 
 281. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 282. FAM. LAW § 1-201(a)(6). 
 283. Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73, 82–83, 195 A. 306, 310 (1937) (“Since the general 
effect of the decree of adoption under the statute was to terminate the legal relations be-
tween the child and its natural parents, the statute contemplated that the custody of the 
infant, which was an incident of the parental relation, would no longer be the right of the 
natural parents, but would be the exclusive right of the adoptive parents.”).  But see In re 
Adoption of Francisco A., 866 P.2d 1175, 1181 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (“Although granting 
visitation to a nonparent does affect a parent’s custody rights, this is not sufficient reason 
to apply a blanket rule against such decrees.  It is well established in New Mexico that par-
ents do not have absolute rights in their children; rather, parental rights are secondary to 
the best interests and welfare of the children.”).  
 284. FAM. LAW § 5-352(a)(2)(ii). 
 285. See L.F.M. v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 67 Md. App. 379, 397, 507 A.2d 1151, 1160 (1986) 
(stating “that the legislature is the appropriate forum in which to decide the matters of 
family policy involved [in post-adoption visitation]”). 
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3.  The General Assembly Should Authorize Courts to Extend Post-
Termination Contact Orders into the Post-Adoption Period 
Because It Would Be in the Best Interest of Some Children and 
Because It Would Not Violate Adoptive Parents’ Right to Raise 
Their Adopted Children as They See Fit  
Research in the field of psychology demonstrates that post-
adoption contact between adopted children and their biological par-
ents would be beneficial for many adopted children.  Because protect-
ing and promoting child welfare falls within the State’s parens patriae 
authority, the State of Maryland should be able to require such con-
tact in cases that warrant it.286  Since adoption is a statutory mechan-
ism, before courts could order such contact, the General Assembly 
would need to authorize courts to adjudicate in this arena.287  Legis-
lating in this context, however, the General Assembly must be mindful 
of the adoptive parents’ fundamental right to raise their children as 
they see fit without undue State interference.288
a.  The Proposed Post-Adoption Legislation Could Become Part of 
the Existing TPR and Adoption After TPR Statutes  
  Court-ordered post-
adoption contact will not violate the adoptive parents’ rights if the 
post-adoption legislation is linked to the existing post-termination vi-
sitation provision and hinges upon a finding of exceptional circums-
tances overcoming the presumption that the adoptive parents’ deci-
sion not to allow visitation is in their child’s best interest. 
The current statutory framework governing termination of pa-
rental rights and adoption after termination of parental rights in 
Maryland has all of the prerequisites for the proposed court-ordered 
post-adoption visitation legislation.289
 
 286. See supra text accompanying notes 
  During the 2005 overhaul of 
33–40; Williams, supra note 19, at 630 (“States 
should not fail to recognize their responsibility to further the best interests of children in 
fear of potentially infringing on adoptive parents’ rights.”).  
 287. See supra text accompanying note 285.  
 288. See infra Part II.B.3.b.i. 
 289. For discussion of other ways to preserve some aspects of the biological parent-child 
relationship, see Garrison, supra note 102, at 425, 444 (arguing against termination of pa-
rental rights, except for cases where it is necessary to protect the child against “specific, 
significant harm” and advocating for other alternatives promoting permanency, such as 
guardianship by the long-term foster parents and continued visitation by the biological 
parents or long-term foster care contracts); Nitti, supra note 104, at 1035–39 (suggesting 
“open adoption,” whereby biological parents rights would lose their parental rights but 
retain visitation rights, would be a better alternative than terminating parental rights based 
on the psychological parenthood concept); Candace M. Zierdt, Make New Parents but Keep 
the Old, 69 N.D. L. REV. 497, 498–99 (1993) (arguing for “weak adoptions,” which “termi-
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TPR and adoption laws, the General Assembly acknowledged the 
child’s need for continuity of relationships with the child’s biological 
parents by enacting two new provisions.  First, through the TPR laws, 
the General Assembly began to allow courts to order post-termination 
visitation between the child and any individual.290  Second, through 
the adoption statute, it began to authorize post-adoption visitation 
agreements and require that all such agreements come before the 
court as part of the adoption petition.291  The General Assembly could 
thus take one more step toward openness in adoptions and amend 
the adoption statute to allow the post-termination visitation order to 
survive adoption.292
Specifically, the General Assembly could do that by amending 
the adoption laws to require (1) that—as with the post-adoption visita-
tion agreements—any post-termination visitation order be made part 
of the adoption petition,
 
293 and (2) that the adoption court review the 
appropriateness of post-termination contact ordered by the TPR court 
during the adoption proceeding.294  The first requirement—that any 
post-termination visitation order be filed together with the adoption 
petition—would ensure that the adoption court is aware of the post-
termination visitation order even though the biological parent is not a 
party in the adoption proceedings.295
 
nate[] most, but not all, of a birthparent’s rights to her child(ren)” and allow the birthpa-
rent to “retain court ordered and legally enforceable visitation rights”). 
  The second requirement—that 
the adoption court review the post-termination visitation order—
would allow the court to use the record created at the TPR hearing 
and rely on the factual findings made by the TPR court, such as the 
nature of the relationship between the child and the biological par-
 290. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-324(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 291. Id. § 5-308; id. § 5-345(c)(ii). 
 292. Cf. Cynthia E. Cordle, Open Adoption: The Need for Legislative Action, 2 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 275, 276, 289–90 (1995) (while not necessarily advocating for post-adoption 
contact between biological parents and their children, pointing out that if a legislature 
decided to allow “open adoptions,” it could amend the state’s termination of parental 
rights statute to allow parents to retain visitation rights).  
 293. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7)(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (requiring that “[i]f 
a child is placed for adoption, the nature and frequency of the communication or contact 
must be reviewed by the court at the time the child is placed for adoption”). 
 294. Cf. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-345(c)(1)(ii) (requiring post-adoption visitation 
agreements be attached to the adoption petition).  In cases where there is a post-adoption 
visitation agreement, the adoption court should defer to the parties’ agreement.  See Ap-
pell, supra note 139, at 9 (observing that “the agreement of the parties models a more pri-
vate and organic family operation and is more consistent with U.S. norms of family auton-
omy” than the court-ordered post-adoption model). 
 295. See supra text accompanying notes 64–67. 
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ent, the visitation history, and the emotional effect of the termination 
of parental rights on the child.296
If upon consideration of these and other relevant factors,
   
297 the 
court finds that discontinuation of contact with the biological parent 
would be detrimental to the child’s best interest, it would order post-
termination visitation to continue past adoption.  The amended sta-
tute should, however, give the adoptive and biological parents an op-
portunity to work out the conditions of contact through mediation.298  
If they are unable to come to an agreement, the adoption court would 
spell out the nature and frequency of contact.299
As in the case with a post-adoption agreement, court-ordered 
post-adoption visitation would be enforceable in court, but a party’s 
noncompliance with a post-adoption contact order would not give 
grounds for setting aside the adoption order itself.
   
300  Finally, like 
post-adoption visitation agreements, the post-adoption contact order 
should be subject to modification upon a showing of “an exceptional 
circumstance [that] has arisen and [if] the court finds modification to 
be in an adoptee’s best interests.”301
 
 296. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0427(1)(a) (requiring adoption court to consider the TPR 
court’s post-termination visitation order).  Other considerations include 
“[r]ecommendations of the department, the foster parents if other than the adoptive par-
ents, and the guardian ad litem,” “[s]tatements of the prospective adoptive parents,” and 
“[a]ny other information deemed relevant and material by the court.”  Id. § 63.0427.  
  By making the post-adoption 
contact part of the existing TPR and adoption after TPR statutes, the 
General Assembly will further emphasize the interconnectedness of 
 297. See infra Part II.B.3.b.ii. 
 298. See Emily Chase Dubansky, Note, Koshko v. Haining: Does a Heightened Standard for 
Grandparent Visitation Really Protect Children’s Best Interests?, 67 MD. L. REV. 805, 828 (2008) 
(arguing the Maryland General Assembly should make mediation mandatory in all third-
party visitation cases to avoid litigation where the third party must challenge parental deci-
sion regarding visitation which may be harmful to children). 
 299. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0427(d) (“If the court determines that the child’s best in-
terests will be served by postadoption communication or contact, the court shall so order, 
stating the nature and frequency for the communication or contact.”). 
 300. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-308(d), (f) (West 2006) (explaining that a viola-
tion of a post-adoption agreement is not grounds for setting aside the adoption); see also 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0427 (“This order shall be made a part of the final adoption order, 
but in no event shall the continuing validity of the adoption be contingent upon such 
postadoption communication or contact.”). 
 301. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-308(f)(2); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0427 (“[T]he 
adoptive parent may, at any time, petition for review of a communication or contact order 
entered pursuant to subsection (1), if the adoptive parent believes the best interests of the 
adopted child are being compromised, and the court shall have authority to order the 
communication or contact to be terminated or modified, as the court deems to be in the 
best interests of the adopted child.  As part of the review process, the court may order the 
parties to engage in mediation.”). 
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the two statutes and enable the adoption court to rely on the evidence 
before it and the factual findings made by the TPR court. 
b.  The Proposed Legislation Would Be Constitutional If It Gives 
Proper Weight to the Presumption That the Adoptive Parents 
Know Best Whether Contact with Biological Parents Is in the 
Child’s Best Interest  
Although legislation authorizing courts to order post-adoption 
contact would fall within the State’s parens patriae power, in order to 
withstand a constitutional challenge it must not violate the adoptive 
parents’ right to raise their children as they see fit.  The adoptive par-
ents acquire a fundamental right to raise their adopted children as 
they see fit, free from State interference, because the adoption decree 
makes them the new legal parents of the adopted children.302  Since a 
fundamental right is involved, if the proposed post-adoption contact 
legislation became subject to a constitutional challenge, it would un-
dergo a strict scrutiny standard of review.303  Under this standard of 
constitutional review, “a statute may be validated only if it is deemed 
to be suitably, or narrowly, tailored to further a compelling state in-
terest.”304
 
 302. FAM. LAW § 5-352(a)(2). 
  Despite this high standard, if the proposed legislation gives 
proper weight to the presumption that the adoptive parents’ decision 
whether to allow contact between their adopted children and their 
biological parents is in the children’s best interest, the post-adoption 
statute will withstand any constitutional challenge.  
 303. See Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 431, 921 A.2d 171, 186 (2007) (“In matters 
implicating state interference with a fundamental right we generally apply the strict scruti-
ny standard.”).  In Koshko, the Court of Appeals observed that some courts had subjected 
statutes to strict scrutiny only in cases where the State’s interference was “significant.”  Id. 
at 431–32, 921 A.2d at 186–87 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  Be-
cause in Koshko the court found the grandparent visitation statute constituted a “direct and 
substantial” interference with the parents’ right to raise their children as they see fit, legis-
lation authorizing courts to order post-adoption contact would also work a “direct and 
substantial interference” with adoptive parents’ rights.  Id. at 434, 921 A.2d at 188–89.  
Thus, the proposed post-adoption statute would be subject to strict scrutiny even under 
the more selective “significant interference” approach.   
 304. Id. at 438, 921 A.2d at 191.  
FoehrkolbFinalBookProof 3/14/2012  12:46 PM 
2012] POST-ADOPTION CONTACT BY COURT ORDER 537 
i.  Adoptive Parents Enjoy the Same Constitutional Protections 
as the Biological Parents Had Enjoyed Before Their 
Parental Rights Were Terminated, but the Adoptive Parents’ 
Right to Make Parenting Decisions Is Not Absolute and 
May Give Way to the State’s Parens Patriae Interest 
If prior to termination of their parental rights, the child’s biolog-
ical parents’ relationship with their children had enjoyed constitu-
tional protection, upon termination of parental rights, the biological 
parents become legal strangers to the child and lose all their “duties, 
obligations, and rights toward [the child.]”305  Conversely, upon the 
court’s entry of an adoption order, the adoptive parents become the 
child’s parents “for all intent and purposes.”306  As a result, by the vir-
tue of adoption, the adoptive parents are entitled to the same consti-
tutional protections that the biological parents had lost by virtue of 
termination of their parental rights.307
The adoptive parents’ newly acquired liberty interest in raising 
their adopted children as they see fit without the State’s interference 
includes the right to decide whom the child will or will not visit.
  
308  
Thus, if a court were to extend the effect of a post-termination visita-
tion order past adoption without affording any additional protections 
to the adoptive parents, it would infringe on the adoptive parents’ 
fundamental constitutionally-based right to raise their child without 
the State’s interference.309  Moreover, even though court-ordered visi-
tation may not seem like a very significant intrusion, it is an intrusion 
nonetheless because “like custody, [it] intrudes upon the fundamen-
tal right of parents to direct the ‘care, custody, and control’ of their 
children.”310
This does not mean, however, that the State may not intrude on 
the adoptive parents’ right when the child’s welfare is at stake.  The 
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and Maryland 
courts demonstrates that the balance between parents’ fundamental 
right to make parenting decisions free from the State’s interference 
on the one hand, and the State’s parens patriae interest in protecting 
and promoting child welfare on the other hand, equally applies to 
  
 
 305. FAM. LAW § 5-325(a). 
 306. Id. § 5-352(a)(2). 
 307. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 308. See Koshko, 398 Md. at 423, 921 A.2d at 182 (stating that parents are “entitled to the 
long-settled presumption that a parent’s decision regarding the custody or visitation of his 
or her child with third parties is in the child’s best interest”). 
 309. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 310. Koshko, 398 Md. at 430, 921 A.2d at 186.   
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adoptive parents.  Thus, the constitutionally-protected right to parent 
that the adoptive parents acquire through adoption is not absolute 
and is subject to limitation when it conflicts with the State’s interest in 
protecting and promoting the welfare of children who cannot protect 
themselves.311
Indeed, parents’ right to raise their children as they see fit has 
been infused with limitations since it was first recognized.  Beginning 
with Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court has emphasized that 
“the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest,” and 
neither are the “rights of parenthood . . . beyond limitation.”
   
312  The 
Maryland Court of Appeals also observed that, “[o]ne need not wand-
er far into the thickets of family law before running into situations 
and circumstances where application of an absolute right of the par-
ent would fail to produce a just result.”313  Accordingly, while the 
adoptive parents’ decision regarding their adopted child’s contact 
with his or her biological parent is due a presumption of validity,314 
the State may substitute its own judgment for that of the adoptive 
parents when their decision conflicts with the State’s parens patriae re-
sponsibility of promoting child welfare.315  Before the State does that, 
however, there must be exceptional circumstances indicating that dis-
continuance of visitation with the biological parents would have a de-
trimental effect on the child to be adopted.316
ii. The Presumption That Adoptive Parents Act in Their 
Adopted Child’s Best Interest May Be Overcome by Similar 
Exceptional Circumstances as Those Used in Third-Party 
Custody, Visitation, TPR Proceedings, and Contested 
Adoption Cases  
   
As with third-party custody, visitation, TPR proceedings, and con-
tested adoption cases, the presumption that the adoptive parents’ de-
cision against post-adoption contact is best for the child may be over-
come by exceptional circumstances that show discontinuation of 
contact with the biological parent to be detrimental to the child’s best 
 
 311. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 312. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).  
 313. In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 568, 819 A.2d 1030, 1040 (2003). 
 314. See Koshko, 398 Md. at 439, 921 A.2d at 192 (discussing the presumption that a par-
ent’s decision regarding visitation should not be disturbed). 
 315. The State must be able to intervene as parens patriae to promote the child’s best 
interest because “[r]ather than furthering the best interests of the child, an adoptive par-
ent may be more concerned with having complete parental control over the child.”  Wil-
liams, supra note 19, at 622. 
 316. See supra Part I.B.2.b.  
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interest.317  Because of the many similarities and overlaps between 
third-party visitation, custody, TPR proceedings, and contested adop-
tion cases, the same factors that courts rely on in finding exceptional 
circumstances in those types of cases are likely to be helpful in the 
context of post-adoption contact.  Furthermore, the focus of these ex-
ceptional circumstance factors must likewise be in the child’s best in-
terest, as opposed to the biological or the adoptive parents’ inter-
ests.318
Indeed, despite the Court of Appeals’ “occasional rhetoric” plac-
ing parental rights above the child’s best interest, the child’s best in-
terest has been the governing standard at all stages of the analysis in 
cases involving child custody.
   
319  Maryland’s TPR jurisprudence sup-
ports the view that the child’s best interest—not the parents’ circums-
tances—is the proper focus in determining whether there are excep-
tional circumstances making parental relationship detrimental to the 
child’s best interest.320  As the Court of Appeals clarified in Ta’Niya, 
the inquiry into exceptional circumstances is “intended only to place 
the parent’s important rights in proper perspective, not to elevate it 
above the child’s best interest, which is the standard infusing all ele-
ments of the typical child custody analysis.”321  Thus, “[s]ince one 
cannot make a determination of whether there are exceptional cir-
cumstances that would overcome the presumption of parental rights 
and make continuation of parental rights detrimental to the child’s 
best interest without looking into the child’s best interest, the ulti-
mate focus of the juvenile court’s inquiry must be on the child’s best 
interest.”322
In deciding whether the presumption that the adoptive parent’s 
decision not to allow visitation with the biological parent is in the 
child’s best interest, the court may borrow a number of exceptional 
circumstance factors courts use in third-party custody, visitation, con-
tested adoption, and TPR proceedings.  Namely, the following third-
party custody and visitation exceptional factors may be relevant: (1) 
the length of time the parent and the child were separated, (2) the 
age of the child when the child was first separated from the parent, 
  Accordingly, the exceptional circumstances analysis in 
the post-adoption visitation context must likewise focus on the child’s 
best interest.  
 
 317. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 318. See supra text accompanying notes 210–219.   
 319. Ta’Niya, 417 Md. 90, 111, 116, 8 A.3d 745, 758, 761 (2010). 
 320. See supra text accompanying notes 217–219.   
 321. Ta’Niya, 417 Md. at 111, 8 A.3d at 757. 
 322. Id. at 116, 8 A.3d at 761. 
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and (3) the attachment between the child and the biological par-
ent.323  Additionally, like the courts in contested adoption cases, 
courts deciding the appropriateness of post-adoption contact may in-
quire into “the relative effect upon the child’s stability of having 
one . . . or both, of the relationships continue;” and “the emotional 
effect of the adoption on the child.”324
Likewise, because many of the statutory exceptional circumstance 
factors courts consider in TPR proceedings address the effect of se-
verance of the parent-child relationship on the child’s psychological 
well-being, they would be helpful in deciding whether there are ex-
ceptional circumstances in the post-adoption visitation context.
  
325  
These factors include “the child’s emotional ties with and feelings to-
ward the child’s parents, the child’s siblings, and others who may af-
fect the child’s best interests significantly;” “the child’s feelings about 
severance of the parent-child relationship”; and “the likely impact of 
terminating parental rights on the child’s well-being.”326
Furthermore, in accordance with the courts’ willingness to sup-
plement additional exceptional circumstance factors depending on 
the circumstances of a particular case,
  
327 in the context of post-
adoption contact it would be appropriate for the court to inquire into 
the impact of the severance of the biological connection on the 
child’s development.328  It may be proper for courts to consider 
whether in the absence of contact with the biological parent, the 
adoptive parent would be able and willing to provide the adopted 
child with information on his or her socio-genealogical background.  
This inquiry is relevant because psychological research indicates the 
quantity and quality of information a child has regarding his or her 
socio-genealogical background affects the child’s identity formation, 
self-worth, and general well-being.329
 
 323. See supra text accompanying note 
  Additionally, for the post-
adoption contact to have any benefit at all, the biological parent must 
194.  
 324. In re No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 562, 640 A.2d 1085, 1097 (1994). 
 325. See supra text accompanying note 209.  
 326. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-323(d)(4) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 327. See Aumiller v. Aumiller, 183 Md. App. 71, 80–81, 959 A.2d 849, 855 (2008) (ob-
serving that courts “supplement [the exceptional circumstances factors] with additional 
factors based on the specific facts and circumstances before the court”).  
 328. See supra Part I.B.1.c. 
 329. See OWUSU-BEMPAH, supra note 77, at 33–34 (hypothesizing that the amount of in-
formation the child has about his or her biological heritage determines the child’s percep-
tion of connectedness and belonging).  
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be committed to maintaining the relationship with the child;330
Therefore, based on Maryland’s third-party custody, visitation, 
contested adoption cases, and TPR proceedings, in deciding whether 
there are exceptional circumstances making discontinuation of con-
tact with the biological parent after adoption detrimental to the 
child’s best interest, it would be appropriate for courts to consider 
such factors as (1) the length of time during which the biological par-
ent and the child were separated, (2) the age of the child when the 
child was first separated from the biological parent, (3) the attach-
ment between the child and the biological parent,
 and 
thus, the court must inquire into how committed the biological par-
ent is to the preservation of this aspect of the parent-child relation-
ship. 
331 (4) “the relative 
effect upon the child’s stability of having one . . . or both, of the rela-
tionships continue,” (5) “the emotional effect of the adoption on the 
child,”332 (6) “the child’s emotional ties with and feelings toward the 
child’s [biological] parents, the child’s siblings, and other [biological 
family members],” (7) the child’s feelings about discontinuation of 
contact with the biological parent upon adoption, (8) the likely im-
pact of discontinuation of contact with the biological parent on the 
child’s well-being,333
 
 330. See Williams, supra note 
 (9) the likelihood the child’s adoptive parents 
would make efforts to make available to the adopted child informa-
tion on the child’s socio-genealogical background in the absence of 
contact with the child’s biological parent, and (10) the likelihood the 
biological parent would maintain the court-ordered contact.  If upon 
consideration of these factors the court finds exceptional circums-
tances making discontinuance of contact detrimental to the child’s 
best interest, it may order post-adoption visitation between the child 
and his or her biological parent. 
19, at 627 (“Post-termination contact will never be in the 
best interests of a child unless his or her birth parent is not only willing to maintain con-
tact, but is also committed to and invested in maintaining contact.”).  
 331. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 191, 372 A.2d 582, 593 (1977).  
 332. In re No. A91-71A, 334 Md. 538, 562, 640 A.2d 1085, 1097 (1994). 
 333. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-323(d)(4) (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
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iii. The Proposed Legislation Would Be Constitutional Under 
Koshko if It Requires a Finding of Exceptional 
Circumstances Making Discontinuation of Contact with 
the Biological Parent Detrimental to the Child’s Best 
Interest 
If the proposed post-adoption legislation was subject to a consti-
tutional challenge, it would be constitutional even under the strict 
scrutiny standard of review because it is “suitably, or narrowly, tailored 
to further a compelling state interest.”334  The Court of Appeals’ anal-
ysis of the constitutionality of Maryland’s grandparent visitation sta-
tute in Koshko is instructive.335  The Koshko court “appl[ied] a gloss to 
the Maryland GVS requiring a threshold showing of either parental 
unfitness or exceptional circumstances indicating that the lack of 
grandparental visitation has a significant deleterious effect upon the 
children who are the subject of the petition.”336  Under this analysis, 
the proposed post-adoption legislation would likely survive a constitu-
tional challenge.  If preserving the relationship with grandparents was 
sufficiently compelling in Koshko because of the numerous benefits of 
contact between children and their biological parents,337
A court would also likely find the proposed legislation to be nar-
rowly tailored to further this State interest.  If the proposed legislation 
permits courts to order post-adoption contact only in cases where dis-
continuation of post-termination visitation would be detrimental to 
the child’s best interest, the legislation would not violate the adoptive 
parents’ constitutional rights: the child’s best interest standard en-
compasses the presumption that the parent always acts in the child’s 
best interest.
 then the 
State’s interests in authorizing courts to order post-adoption contact 
are sufficiently compelling as well.   
338
 
 334. See Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 438, 921 A.2d 171, 191 (2007) (citations omit-
ted).  
  As a precaution, however, similarly to the TPR statute, 
the General Assembly may expressly require a finding of exceptional 
circumstances making the adoptive parent’s decision to discontinue 
post-termination visitation detrimental to the child’s best interest.   
 335. See supra text accompanying notes 195–201. 
 336. Koshko, 398 Md. at 441, 921 A.2d at 192–93.    
 337. Id. at 438–39, 921 A.2d at 191 (“There can be no legitimate debate as to the suffi-
ciency of the State’s compelling interests here, chief of which is the overarching role as 
parens patriae to ensure the well-being of Maryland’s children. . . .  The State’s interest in 
encouraging the salutary contributions grandparents make to the lives of their grandchil-
dren is clearly a compelling one.” (citations omitted)).  
 338. See supra text accompanying notes 319–324. 
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Furthermore, since the initial finding that contact with the bio-
logical parents is in the child’s best interest would be made during the 
TPR proceeding when the adoptive parents are still prospective adop-
tive parents, the adoptive parents would not “be hailed into court to 
defend their decisions.”339  Instead, they would be on notice of the 
post-termination visitation order and understand the contact between 
the child they seek to adopt and his or her biological parents may 
continue post-adoption.340
III. CONCLUSION 
  Therefore, because legislation authorizing 
courts to order visitation between adopted parents and their biologi-
cal parents would (1) further a compelling state interest of promoting 
child welfare and (2) be narrowly tailored to further that interest by 
requiring courts find exceptional circumstances, the legislation would 
not violate adoptive parents’ constitutional rights. 
Authorizing courts to extend the effect of post-termination visita-
tion orders past adoption, thereby allowing contact between adopted 
children and their biological parents in adoptions following termina-
tions of parental rights, would be in the child’s best interest.  It would 
also not violate the adoptive parents’ fundamental right to raise their 
children as they see fit free from the State’s undue interference.341  
This Comment has sought to demonstrate that the continuance of 
adopted foster children’s contact with their biological parents after 
termination of parental rights and the subsequent adoption would 
promote the children’s developmental needs and emotional well-
being by preserving continuity of their relationships with the biologi-
cal parents and allowing them to stay connected to their socio-
genealogical roots.342
Courts must use their authority to order post-termination visita-
tion between foster children and their biological parents whose pa-
rental rights have been terminated in cases where such visitation is in 
the child’s best interest.  Furthermore, because post-termination visi-
tation orders are of a limited duration in cases where adoption follows 
termination of parental rights, in order to fully carry out the State of 
Maryland’s parens patriae role in promoting child welfare, the Mary-
land General Assembly has an obligation and authority to allow courts 
to extend the effect of post-termination visitation orders past adop-
  
 
 339. Koshko, 398 Md. at 439, 921 A.2d at 192.  
 340. See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
 341. See supra Part II.B.3.b.iii. 
 342. See supra Part I.B.1.c & II.A. 
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tion.343  The General Assembly could narrowly tailor the post-
adoption contact legislation to further the State’s compelling interest 
by requiring that courts order post-adoption contact only in cases 
where there are exceptional circumstances making discontinuance of 
post-termination contact detrimental to the child’s best interest.344  
Thus, if the post-adoption statute focuses on the child’s best interest 
with the rebuttable presumption favoring parental decisions regard-
ing visitation, it would allow courts to come one step closer to meeting 
the child’s best interest without violating the adoptive parents’ consti-
tutional right to parent.345
 
  
 
 343. See supra Part I.A.1 & II.B.2. 
 344. See supra Part II.B.2.b.ii. 
 345. See supra Part II.B.3.iii. 
